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INTRODUCTION
In Roe v. Wade,' the United States Supreme Court established a woman's
right to terminate her pregnancy within the first trimester. The Court deter-
mined that the abortion decision fell within a cumulative right of privacy
implicit in the Constitution.- This landmark 1973 decision legalized abortion,
put reproductive choice solely in the hands of individual women, and shielded
that choice from government interference. Immediately following Roe, oppo-
nents of abortion began to organize? At first, their efforts remained within the
political process. Abortion opponents attempted but were unable to pass a
constitutional amendment declaring a fetus to be a human person, but were
successful in cutting Medicaid funds for abortion with the first Hyde Amend-
ment in 1977. Today, no federal funding exists for abortion or abortion-re-
lated services unless a woman's life is in danger or in the case or rape or
incest.' On the state level, abortion opponents have successfully passed laws
I. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152, 153. The right of privacy is not explicit within the text of
the Constitution. The Court in Roe, however, looked to many of its prior opinions that rec-
ognized "a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain zones of privacy." Id. Various
places within the Constitution have been found to protect an element of privacy. See Stanley
v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (finding privacy within the First Amendment); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968) (finding privacy within the Fourth and Fifth Amendments);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (finding privacy within the penumbra of
the Bill of Rights and in the Ninth Amendment); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923) (finding privacy within the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment). Because the right of privacy had been extended to encompass mat-
ters relating to marriage in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); to procreation in
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); to family relationships in Prince v. Mas-
sachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); and to child rearing and education in Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510. 535 (1925) and Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court in Roe extended the
zone of privacy to include a woman's decision to terminate a pregnancy. Roe, 410 U.S. at
153.
3. For an in-depth political and historical commentary, see ROSALIND P. PETECHESKY,
ABORTION AND WOMAN'S CHOICE (1990). The Catholic Church organized "right-to-life"
committees to oppose legalization of abortion as early as 1970. After Roe, it launched a full-
scale legal and educational campaign against abortion. /d. at 241-51; see also STEPHEN M.
KRASON, ABORTION POLITICS, MORALITY AND THE CONSTITUTION 62-75 (1984) (discussing
the emergence of the antiabortion movement).
4. See PETECHESKY, supra note 3, at 242. When their efforts to pass a constitutional
amendment failed, antiabortion activists shifted their attention to federal funding of abortions.
What became known as the "Hyde Amendment," was a 1976 amendment to the annual
appropriations bill for the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare which prohibited the
use of federal funds for abortions "except where the life of the mother would be endangered
if the fetus were carried to tem." Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1418 (1976). The
Supreme Court subsequently upheld the Hyde Amendment based on its conclusion that a
constitutional right does not necessarily translate into an entitlement. Thus, neither the states
nor the federal government is obligated to fund non-therapeutic abortions. See Williams v.
Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S.
438 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
5. The most recently enacted Hyde Amendment, adopted as part of the federal Medic-
aid budget, allows funding for abortion in cases of rape and incest in addition to life endan-
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creating barriers to abortion such as waiting periods and parental notification.6
These political victories, however, were not enough. Abortion remained
legal. To those opposing it, the only solution was to stop abortion. Such ideol-
ogy has led to protest activities outside abortion facilities in the form of pick-
eting, leafletting, and "counseling."7 Violent tactics have been used as well.
As early as 1977, protestors began bombing clinics, threatening clinic person-
nel, and assaulting patients in their effort to stop abortions.8 Since 1977, there
have been 1,712 reported incidents of violence against abortion providers.9
Following Roe, the abortion debate became a source of political and social
division within the United States, creating an immutable boundary between
those who sought to overturn Roe and those who fought to uphold it."
In 1992, the Supreme Court was given the opportunity to overturn Roe. In
Planned Parenthood v. Casey," the Court preserved the central holding of
Roe that a woman has the right to end her pregnancy within the first trimes-
ter. The decision did, however, open the door to restrictions that do not
place an "undue burden" on a woman's right to undergo an abortion." When
the decision was announced, Justice David Souter characterized the case as
one in which "the Court's interpretation of the Constitution calls the contend-
ing sides of a national controversy to end their national division by accepting a
common mandate rooted in the Constitution.""
germent. See Portrait of hijustice, REPROD. FREEDOM IN THE STATES (Center for Reprod. L.
and Poly. New York, N.Y.). Oct. 25, 1994. Some states voluntarily provide coverage beyond
life endangerment, rape, and incest, while other states restrict coverage to life endangerment
and are in conflict with federal law. Challenges to restrictive Medicaid funding measures are
pending in Colorado. Louisianna, Michigan. Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota. Oklahoma,
and Pennsylvania. Id.
6. Sixteen states require a woman to delay her procedure by a number of hours or
days after receiving state-mandaled literature designed to discourage abortion. Mandator
Delavs ond Biased Infornation Provisions. REPROD. FREEDOM IN THE STATES (Center for
Reprod. L. and Poly, New York, N.Y.), Jan. 9, 1995. Laws in thirty-six states require
young women to obtain the consent or to notify one or both parents prior to obtaining an
abortion. Restrictions on Young Women, REPROD. FREEDOM IN THE STATES (Center for
Reprod. L. and Polry, New York, N.Y.), Sept. 8, 1994.
7. See EVA R. RUBIN, ABORTION, POLITICS, AND THE COURTS 138 n.72 (1982).
8. Id.
9. Incidents of Violence & Disruiption Against Abortion Providers, 1994, NEWS RE-
LEASE (National Abortion Fed'n, Washington, D.C.), Dec. 1994 (on file with author). In
1994 alone, protestors committed 159 acts of violence. The figure includes: 5 murders, 8
attempted murders, 3 bombings, 5 arsons, 4 attempted bombing/arsons, 2 clinic invasions, 42
acts of vandalism, 7 assaults. 59 death threats, 3 burglaries, and 22 stalking incidents. In
1993, there were 434 acts of violence perpetrated against abortion providers, most notably
the murder of Dr. David Gunn in Pensacola, Florida and the attempted murder of Dr.
George Tiller in Wichita. Kansas. Id.
10. See generally EVA R. RUBIN, THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY (1994); see also
PETCHESKY, supra note 3, at 252.
II. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
12. hi. at 2816-17.
13. Id. at 2819. For examples of the kinds of restrictions that became permissible after
Casev, see supra note 6.
14. hI. at 2815; see also David J. Garrow. Juistice Souter Emerges, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
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Unfortunately, battle lines in the abortion controversy remain unmoved.
Antiabortion organizations such as Operation Rescue and the Pro-life Action
League continue to organize protests across the country in their crusade to
stop abortion."s Frustrated by their lack of success in the courts, in the legis-
lature, and in public opinion," many abortion opponents continue to go be-
yond peaceful protest. 7 Of recent note is the murder of two clinic personnel
and the wounding of five others in Brookline, Massachusetts on December 31,
1994. These murders, along with the 1994 murders of Dr. John Britton and his
volunteer escort and the 1993 murder of Dr. David Gunn, increased the death
toll to five." Other terrorist tactics employed by antiabortion activists include
verbally assaulting clinic patients, stalking clinic personnel, harassing family
members and neighbors of abortion doctors and clinic personnel, and issuing
death threats. 9 Protestors physically prevent access to abortion facilities by
25, 1994, § 6 (Magazine), at 36, 39 (discussing Justice Souter's role in Casey and his com-
mitment to stare decisis).
15. See H.R. REP. No. 306, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1994), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 699, 706 (Attorney General Janet Reno testified that "much of the activity has
been orchestrated by groups functioning on a nationwide scale, including, but not limited to,
Operation Rescue whose members and leadership have been involved in litigation in numer-
ous areas of the country."); see also John W. Whitehead, Civil Disobedience and Operation
Rescue: A Historical and Theoretical Analysis, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 77 (1991).
16. A Democratic Leadership poll found 57% of registered voters believe abortion gen-
erally should be available. AMERICAN POLITICAL NETWORK, Poll Update DLC Poll: 57% Say
Abortion Should Be Generally Available, 6 ABORTION REPORT No. 86, Nov. 18, 1994, avail-
able in WL, APN-AB Database, List & Date Query. A National Gallup poll found that 83%
of Americans believe it is inappropriate for individuals to block women's access to abortion
clinics. Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, FACT SHEET (The Fund for the Feminist
Majority, Arlington, Va.), Nov. 1993. In a 1992 poll testing identification of the public with
the pro-life and pro-choice positions, 58% of the adults polled were in favor of choice.
RUBIN, supra note 10, at 282. However, a Wirthlin poll conducted for the National Right to
Life Committee following the November 1994 elections indicated that only 41% of Ameri-
cans say they are pro-choice. AMERICAN POLITICAL NETWORK, Results Pro-Life Poll: Finds
53% of Americans Say They're Pro-Life, 6 ABORTION REPORT No. 80, Nov. 10, 1994, avail-
able in WL, APN-AB Database, List & Date Query.
17. E.g., Laurie Goodstein & Pierre Thomas, Clinic Killings Follow Years of Antiabor-
tion Violence, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1995, at Al; Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Booklet Preaches,
Teaches Violence-Abortion Rights Forces Condemn Radical Publication as Proof of a Ter-
rorist Conspiracy, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1995, at A8.
18. Alarmingly, some anti-abortion activists believe the murder of abortion doctors is
'justifiable homicide." See, e.g., Laurie Goodstein, Life and Death Choices, Antiabortion
Faction Tries to Justif, Homicide, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 1994, at Al; David Van Biema,
Apologists for Murder: The FBI Launches a Probe of Abortion-Clinic Violence, Shining a
Spotlight on Extremists Who Defend Homicide, TIME, Aug. 15, 1994, at 39; see also Inside
the Anti-Abortion Underground, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 29, 1994. at 28. Edward Walsh, a pro-life
Pennsylvania businessman, explained, "[ilethal force was a necessary next step because noth-
ing else was stopping abortion." Fawn Vrazo, A Small Chorus for Vigilantes, DET. FREE
PRESS. Jan. 15, 1995, at IF. Other abortion opponents, however, have publicly denounced the
violence. See, e.g.. Tamar Lewin, Death of a Doctor: The Moral Debate-Abortion Doctor
and Bodyguard Slain in Florida; A Cause Worth Killing For? Debate Splits Abortion Foes,
N.Y. TIMES. July 30, 1994, at 1; Tim Nickens, Anti-Abortion Organizations Join to Cull for
Peaceful Protests, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 19, 1995, at lB.
19. For example, Warren M. Hem, M.D., Director of the Boulder Abortion Clinic in
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pouring glue into keyholes, locking their heads to clinic doors, and chaining
themselves to immobile vehicles in front of clinic entrances.0 In addition,
bombings, arson, and butyric acid attacks have seriously harmed clinic em-
ployees and caused millions of dollars worth of property damage. -'
State remedies proved to be an inadequate avenue of redress.22 State stat-
utes often do not encompass the totality of such activity and local law enforce-
ment is often unwilling or unable to combat the problem.23 Because protes-
tors persisted unabashed in their efforts and it became evident that their ac-
tivities were organized on a nationwide scale, abortion providers and pro-
choice organizations sought protection in federal court. Plaintiffs across the
Boulder. Colorado, has been the target of personal harassment since 1973 when he first
received telephone death threats. In 1979, one of the protestors at the Boulder clinic at-
tempted to run Dr. Hem down with his car in the clinic parking lot. In 1980 and 1982,
antiabortion activists threatened Dr. Hem's life to his face at various speaking engagements.
In 1984, Joseph Scheidler, founder of the Pro-Life Action League, told Dr. Hem that he
planned to put him "out of business." In 1988, five shots were fired through the front win-
dows of Dr. Hem's waiting room. On August 16, 1994, Dr. Hem received a letter that
spoke of an "underground network" that was preparing to "take out a number of you abor-
tionist Isic] at the same time no matter where you are." The letter also warned that "bullet
proof vests are not enough to protect guilty murderers. There are other areas on the body
that invite fatal wounds." On December 30, 1994, the night John Salvi murdered two abor-
tion personnel in Brookline, Massachusetts, radio-TV talk show host Bob Enyart invited
viewers to take action against Dr. Her. Enyart displayed Dr. Hem's yellow pages ad on the
screen, including his name, address, and telephone number. Viewers calling into the show all
advocated violence against abortion providers. The two most commonly uttered words on the
program were "Hem" and "kill." Special Report prepared by Warren M. Hem, M.D.. M.P.H.,
Ph.D., Director, Boulder Abortion Clinic for Jo Ann Harris, Director Criminal Division, U.S.
Department of Justice, Wash., D.C. (Jan. 6, 1995) (copy on file with the author); see also
Rene Sanchez, From Year of Promise to Year of Violence Abortion Rights Advocates Decry
Trend Towards Militant Opposition, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 1994, at A14.
20. E.g., Brief for Petitioners at 8-9, National Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct.
798 (1994) (No. 92-780).
21. In 1994, abortion providers across the country reported $670,335 worth of damage
resulting from arson, bombings, and other vandalism. Reported Arson and Bombing Jncidents
(National Abortion Fed'n, Washington, D.C.), Dec., 1994 (on file with author). In 1993,
abortion providers reported $3.7 million worth of damage caused by arson and bombings,
Reported Arson and Bombing Icidents (National Abortion Fed'n, Washington, D.C.), Dec.,
1994 (on file with author) and $853,050 caused by chemical vandalism, Noxious Chemical
Vandalism Incidents at Abortion Clinics (National Abortion Fed'n, Washington, D.C.), May,
1994 (on file with author). In addition, The Feminist Majority Foundation reported that "[in
at least two facilities, staff have suffered long-term disability due to respiratory problems
from the caustic butyric acid used." 1993 Clinic Violence Survey Report 3 (The Feminist
Majority Foundation, Arlington, Va.).
22. Elizabeth L. Crane, Abortion Clinics and Their Antagonists: Protection Front Protes-
tors Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 181, 183-84 (1993) (explaining that
state laws may not be enforced against protestors, and that stiff federal penalties deter pro-
testors more effectively than the minor fines and jail terms imposed by a state); see also
Eleanor H. Norton, Federalizing Feminism: Protection of the Civil Rights of Women Against
Criminal Attacks Needs the Force of Federal Law, THE RECORDER, Aug. II, 1994, at 8; cf
Dana S. Gershon. Stalking Statutes: A New Vehicle to Curb the New Violence of the Radical
Anti-Abortion Movement, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 215 (1994) (arguing that "the time
may have come to reconsider state remedies").
23. Crane, supra note 22, at 183.
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country invoked § 1985(3) of the Reconstruction Era Ku Klux Klan Act 24 and
§ 1962(c) of Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, entitled
"Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations" (RICO), - in an effort to
bring a halt to the violence. Along with defenses based on statutory interpreta-
tion, protestors claimed their actions constituted First Amendment protected
free speech. Freedom of speech, however, has never been without limitation
and has never been a shield for lawless violence.
When called upon to interpret the role of federal law in curtailing violent
abortion protest, the Supreme Court has carved out only a handful of remedies
and left further measures up to legislators. The Court has applied strict statuto-
ry construction, staunchly upheld prior precedent, and claimed to keep under-
lying politics out of the process.26 In 1993, the Supreme Court refused to ap-
ply § 1985(3) to clinic blockaders in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health
Clinic," but a year later approved application of RICO in National Organiza-
tion for Women v. Scheidler." Also in 1994, the Court decided that some
provisions of a judicially created "buffer-zone" were constitutional in Madsen
v. Women's Health Center, Inc.29 Unfortunately, protection for clinics, pa-
tients, and staff has been slow in coming and is still, in many ways, ineffec-
tive. Women won the right to choose in Roe, but that victory is rendered nom-
inal when the government fails to provide adequate protection and women are
forced to defend themselves against militant protestors in order to exercise that
right.
Part I of this Note examines the Court's narrow interpretation of the Ku
Klux Klan Act in Bray, compares it with the Court's expansive reading of
RICO in Scheidler, and offers a possible explanation for the disparate results.
Part 1I discusses the First Amendment concerns in Madsen and considers the
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) provides in relevant part:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the
highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly
or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or
of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing
or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or
securing to all persons . . . the equal protection of the laws; . . . the party so
injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by
such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988).
25. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988).
26. Justice Scalia defended this judicial approach in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health
Clinic, saying, "[wle construe the statute, not the views of most members of the citizenry."
113 S. Ct. 753. 768 (1993). Proponents of an original historical interpretation of the Consti-
tution believe the Court should play a neutral role and apply the law mechanically. Never-
theless, they agree that the Court's decisions are not free from outside influence. For a dis-
cussion of current interpretative theories and the role of the Supreme Court in deciding so-
cial issues, see ROBERT J. MCKEEVER, RAW JUDICIAL POWER? THE SUPREME COURT AND
AMERICAN SOCIETY (1993). See also LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME
COURT AND LEGAL CHANGE: ABORTION AND THE DEATH PENALTY (1992).
27. 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
28. 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
29. 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
[Vol. 72:2
ABORTION PROTEST
impact of that decision on future injunctions. Part III addresses the Freedom of
Access to Clinic Entrances Act, its resistance to constitutional challenge, and
the possibility of review by ihe Supreme Court. Part IV outlines the current
framework available to combat clinic violence and maintain access to abortion
,services. Finally, this Note argues that because the abortion debate is certain to
continue, courts should focus on defining the limits participants must respect
in expressing their viewpoints.
I. STRICT STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CREATES AN ANOMALY
A. The Kit Klux Klan Act
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, prohibits conspira-
cies that either deprive a person of equal protection of the laws or hinder law
enforcement's efforts to maintain equal protection." The legislation, passed
in 1871, was initiated in response to the violence and intimidation perpetrated
by the Ku Klux Klan against blacks and Republicans in the post-Civil War
South."' The language of the original act was subsequently amended, limiting
the civil remedy to private conspiracies aimed at particular classes of citi-
zens. 32 Fearful that the statute would become a general federal tort remedy,
the Supreme Court also narrowed its application in numerous decisions.
Beginning with Collins v. Hardymnan3" in 1951, the Court systematically
denied the broad application § 1985(3) that was intended by the Forty-Second
Congress. In Collins, the defendants were accused of forcibly disrupting the
meetings of a California political association. 4 The association sought relief
under § 1985(3), claiming defendants' actions demonstrated a private conspira-
cy to deprive them of their right to peaceably assemble." The Court, howev-
er, decided that congressional authority to enact § 1985(3) came from the
Fourteenth Amendment, which only proscribed a denial of equal protection by
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988); see supra note 24.
31. Debate on the floor of the Senate at the time the Ku Klux Klan Act was passed,
however, indicates the legislators had in mind a remedy for the protection of all classes of
persons. Dissenting in Brayv, Justice O'Connor cited several legislators from the 42nd Con-
gress. Included in her dissent were the statements of Rep. Garfield that the legislation pro-
tects "particular classes of citizens" and "certain classes of individuals"; statements of Rep.
Barry that "white or black, native or adopted citizens" would be protected under the statute:
statements of Rep. Lowe that "all classes in all States, to persons of every complexion and
of whatever politics" would be protected; and the statement of Rep. Buckley that "yes, even
women" were protected. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753, 800-01
(1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing CONG. GLOBE. 42d Cong., Ist Sess. app. 153-54
(1871)).
32. For a thorough analysis of the legislative history and background of the Ku Klux
Klan Act, see Randolph M. Scott-McLaughlin, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic:
The Supreme Court's Next Opportinir to Unsettle Civil Rights Low, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1357,
1362-80 (1992).
33. 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
34. id. at 653-54.
35. hi. at 655.
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the state.36 Section 1985(3), therefore, could only protect victims of conspira-
cies in which the state was an actor. In one swift blow, the Court com-
pletely eliminated protection for individual civil rights against violations by
private actors. This was a questionable decision considering that the statute
was enacted in response to the actions of the Ku Klux Klan which was, de-
spite membership by state officials, a purely private entity.
Twenty years later, the Court changed its mind in Griffin v.
Breckenridge,38 a case in which several black motorists were stopped along a
Mississippi highway and subsequently beaten by a group of white men.39 In
Griffin, the Court declared that congressional power under § 1985(3) was not
solely derived from the Fourteenth Amendment and that the statute should be
given a sweep as broad as its language.' The Plaintiffs were allowed to pro-
ceed under a private conspiracy theory, claiming a deprivation under the Thir-
teenth Amendment. The Court, still wary that § 1985(3) would become all-
encompassing, limited the statute in other ways. It developed two new require-
ments: first, a plaintiff had to prove the conspirators acted with a "racial, or
perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus;"'" second,
a plaintiff had to identify the source of Congress' power to remedy the par-
ticular deprivation alleged.'2 The Court did not, however, address what
"classes" might qualify for protection under the statute nor what constitutional
sources would support federal protection from a private conspiracy.
The Court later attempted to fill in some of the gaps left open by the
Griffin decision. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott" in-
volved a group of construction workers who refused to join a union and con-
sequently became the victims of harassment and intimidation by local residents
and union members." The workers invoked § 1985(3) alleging a violation of
their First Amendment right of association. The Court first addressed whether
a § 1985(3) action would lie if the defendants' discriminatory intent involved
something other than racial bias. While the Court did not explicitly state that
only racial groups were protected by the statute, it did preclude extension of
the statute to conspiracies based only on "economic" animus." The Court
then addressed the state action requirement. It ruled that a § 1985(3) action
based on deprivation of Fourteenth Amendment rights necessarily required
proof of state involvement.' Deprivation of Thirteenth Amendment rights,
36. Id. at 658.
37. Id. at 658. This decision is troubling in view of legislative debate indicating that
Congress intended § 1985(3) to cover violations of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments. See Scott-McLaughlin, supra note 32, at 1361.
38. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
39. hI. at 90-91.
40. Id. at 97, 105.
41. Id. at 102.
42. Id. at 104, 106.
43. 463 U.S. 825 (1983).
44. Id. at 827-28.
45. I. at 837.
46. Id. at 830-31.
[Vol. 72:2
ABORTION PROTEST
however, by a private actor, as was the case in Griffin, could be maintained as
the Thirteenth Amendment arguably protects only blacks. Implicit in the hold-
ing of Scott, therefore, is a racial animus requirement. These decisions ignore
the fact that § 1985(3) was designed to protect white as well as black victims
of violence and intimidation at the hands of the Ku Klux Klan. The Klan's
targets included their political opposition, the Republican Party, and other
supporters of Reconstruction policies who were undoubtedly white.47
By issuing inconsistent opinions regarding a state action requirement and
by failing to specify the classes of persons protected by § 1985(3), the Su-
preme Court left a great deal of interpretation to lower courts. In addition, the
Court never sufficiently explained its hesitancy to apply the Act as broadly as
that intended by the legislators. Thus, several district courts and circuit courts
of appeal extended application of the statute to a wide variety of discriminato-
ry contexts.48 When the Supreme Court revisited § 1985(3) in Bray v. Alex-
andria Women's Health Clinic, there were well-reasoned rationales to justify
applying the statute to the terrorist activities of antiabortion protesters. The
Court in Bray, however, found those rationales unpersuasive.
B. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic
1. Facts and Procedural History
In January of 1993,' the United States Supreme Court denied application
of § 1985(3) to clinic blockaders in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clin-
ic.4 9 The plaintiffs in Bray included nine clinics in the Washington D.C. met-
ropolitan area and five pro-choice organizations, including the National Orga-
nization for Women (NOW). As state law enforcement had repeatedly been
overwhelmed by Operation Rescue's protest efforts,50 and state law remedies
had proven ineffective, plaintiffs sought relief in federal court. The complaint
alleged that Operation Rescue had violated § 1985(3) by disrupting and block-
ading clinics, thereby denying women equal protection of the laws. The plain-
tiffs argued that Operation Rescue's activity created a class-based conspiracy
designed to prevent women from exercising their constitutional right to inter-
state travel and their right to privacy in seeking abortion services.
The Federal District court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted the
plaintiffs' request under § 1985(3) for a permanent injunction in National
Organization for Women v. Operation Rescue.5 Because many women trav-
eled interstate to obtain abortion services in the Washington metropolitan area,
47. Scott-McLaughlin, supra note 32, at 1366-67.
48. See, e.g., Lisa J. Banks, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic: The Supreme
Court's License for Domestic Terrorism, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 449, 457 n.74 (1994).
49. 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
50. Bray. 113 S. Ct. at 781 (Stevens. J., dissenting) ("Because of the large-scale, highly.
organized nature of petitioners' activities, the local authorities are unable to protect the vic-
tims of petitioners' conspiracy."); see also Crane, supra note 22, at 181.
51. 726 F. Supp. 1483 (E.D. Va. 1989), affl'd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd in
part and vacated in part sub non. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct.
753 (1993).
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the court upheld NOW's claim that Operation Rescue had engaged in a con-
spiracy for the purpose of depriving women seeking abortions the right to
travel interstate.52 Such gender-based discrimination, according to the court,
was sufficient to satisfy the class-based discriminatory element of §
1985(3)." The district court declined, however, to address NOW's claim that
defendants, by conspiring to prevent access to abortion facilities, had also
deprived women of their Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy. The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, finding no abuse of discretion, affirmed the opinion
and the permanent injunction issued by the district court.54 It also refused to
consider whether the right to abortion as a fundamental right of privacy was
within the scope of § 1985(3).s
2. The Supreme Court's Plurality Opinion
On February 25, 1991, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Bray v.
Alexandria Women's Health Clinic. 6 The Court addressed several questions
on review. The first involved whether the protestors' actions resulted from a
"class-based invidiously discriminatory animus." This involved deciding
whether women seeking abortions constituted a "class" and then whether such
a gender-based class qualified for protection under § 1985(3). The second
question analyzed whether respondents had been deprived of constitutional
rights enforceable by Congress. This entailed deciding whether the right of
interstate travel and the right to abortion were entitled to protection under §
1985(3).
Writing for the plurality, Justice Scalia first rejected the contention that
women seeking abortions were a "class" entitled to protection under §
1985(3). Such a finding, he explained, would create a potential cause of action
for every tort victim.57 Justice Scalia also did not believe that defendants'
actions were targeted towards women in general. 8 He argued that opposition
to abortion does not translate into an "invidiously discriminatory animus"
against women." Because the plurality concluded that women as a class were
not the target of civil rights violations in Bray, it declined to address whether
a gender-based conspiracy would be upheld under § 1985(3).'
52. National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. at 1489.
53. h. at 1492.
54. National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582. 585 (1990), rev'd in
part and vacated in part sub nor. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct.
753 (1993).
55. National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d at 586.
56. 498 U.S. 1119 (1991).
57. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 759.
58. Id. at 759-60.
59. Justice Scalia, after citing the definition of "invidious" from Webster's Dictionary:
"Itlending to excite odium, ill will, or envy; likely to give offense; esp. unjustly and irritat-
ingly discriminating," asserted "Iwlhether one agrees or disagrees with the goal of preventing
abortion, that goal in itself . . . does not remotely qualify for such harsh description, and
for such derogatory association with racism." Id. at 761-62.
60. Id. at 759.
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The Court next evaluated whether respondents had alleged a right guaran-
teed by the Constitution against private encroachment as required by Carpen-
ters." While recognizing that the right to interstate travel had been protected
by the Court from private interference in Griffin, Justice Scalia nevertheless
denied such protection in Bray because he believed that interstate travel was
not sufficiently implicated.6 2 The fact that some women had traveled inter-
state to obtain abortion services in the Washington metropolitan area, Justice
Scalia argued, was not enough to show that protestors intended to impede
interstate travel." He went on to explain that antiabortion demonstrations on-
ly physically obstructed access to a particular clinic and therefore did not in
any way affect interstate travel. Justice Scalia equally denied that the right
to abortion was protected from private interference.6" He explained that the
Court in Roe had characterized abortion in terms of a "more general right of
privacy"' under the Constitution and, therefore, was barely afforded protect-
ed from state action. Maintaining the extremely narrow reach of § 1985(3),
Justice Scalia pointed out that only the Thirteenth Amendment had thus far
been accorded protection from both state and private conspiracies.67 The plu-
rality, therefore, was extremely disinclined to protect abortion."
3. The Hindrance Clause
After concluding that the respondents failed to make out a claim under the
deprivation clause of § 1985(3), Justice Scalia took aim at the existence of a
claim under the latter part of § 1985(3). The so-called "hindrance" clause
prohibits conspiracies "for the purpose of preventing or hindering the consti-
tuted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all per-
sons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws."" Be-
cause a claim under the hindrance clause was neither expressly pled nor raised
on certiorari, Justice Scalia vehemently claimed it was not an issue the Court
should address. Justices Souter, Stevens, Blackmun, and O'Connor, however,
agreed in their respective dissenting opinions that a claim under the hindrance
clause should be considered by the Court.
Justice Souter, concurring in part and dissenting in part, acknowledged
that the deprivation clause was restrained by Griffin, which required a racial or
class-based animus, and by Carpenters, which required proof of a right se-




64. Id. at 763.




69. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988). The hindrance clause prohibits acts that interfere with
law enforcement efforts to protect the rights of the plaintiff, whereas the deprivation clause
prohibits acts that directly deprive the plaintiff's rights.
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cured against private action.7" Justice Souter disagreed, however, that the hin-
drance clause was similarly restrained. He undertook a lengthy re-examination
of both Griffin and Carpenters, noting that in both cases the Court construed
only the deprivation clause.7 In his opinion, the two conditions that arose out
of the two cases were in direct conflict with the intentions of the Forty-second
Congress.7 While the principle of stare decisis required that the conditions be
applied to the deprivation clause," Justice Souter opined that the current
Court should be free to construe the meaning of the hindrance clause separate-
ly, since its meaning had not been considered by the Courts in either Griffin or
Carpenters.74 Because he believed both restrictions were inconsistent with the
intended scope of § 19 8 5 (3 )," Souter concluded that the hindrance clause
should be interpreted without them.76 In his view, the hindrance clause would
apply even if the conspirators did not act with a racial or otherwise class-
based animus" and even when the object of their conspiracy was interference
with a constitutional guarantee only against state action."8 Ultimately, howev-
er, Justice Souter found that while the findings of the District Court could
support a hindrance clause violation, it should be remanded for a more express
determination."
The dissenting opinions, penned by Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor,
and joined by Justice Blackmun, focused primarily on their opposition to the
plurality's holding under the deprivation clause. Both opinions, however,
agreed with Justice Souter that the conditions imposed by Griffin and Carpen-
ters limited only the deprivation clause and were inapplicable to the hindrance
c!ause. 0 Justice Stevens pointed to Kush v. Rutledges", an earlier case, in
which the Court refused to apply the class-based animus requirement to anoth-
er section of the Ku Klux Klan Act now codified at § 1985(2)."2 In addition,
he determined that a conspiracy to interfere with the duties of law enforcement
implicated sufficient involvement by the State to trigger the federally protected
right to choose an abortion." As such, it was unnecessary to demonstrate a
right protected from private interference, as required by Carpenters, to make
out a claim under the second clause of § 1985(3)." Justices Stevens and
O'Connor went one step further, finding that a claim under the hindrance
clause was clearly established by the facts. They relied on evidence within the
70. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 770.
71. Id. at 772-76.
72. Id. at 772.
73. Id. at 770.
74. h. at 769-70, 775.
75. I. at 771.
76. Id. at 775.
77. hi. at 775-76.
78. hi. at 776-77.
79. i. at 779.
80. Brav, 113 S. Ct. at 796 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 800 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
81. 460 U.S. 719 (1983).





record that protestors had often overwhelmed local law enforcement and pre-
vented their efforts to maintain clinic access. 5 Such evidence, in the opinions
of both Justices, demonstrated a conspiracy that mirrored the activities of the
Ku Klux Klan and merited redress under § 1983(5).
Justice Scalia, in the plurality opinion, steadfastly responded that his col-
leagues were mistaken in their views regarding the hindrance clause. He ex-
plained that the restrictions formulated in Griffin and Carpenters applied to the
"equal protection of the laws" language found in both clauses under
§1985(3)." The restrictions, therefore, applied unquestionably to the hin-
drance clause, preventing it from being stretched more broadly than the depri-
vation clause." A different interpretation, in his view, would create an imper-
missible inconsistency.88 Justice Scalia emphasized, however, that the mean-
ing of the hindrance clause was not an issue properly before the Court. 9 His
analysis of the issue, therefore, was not dispositive.
Importantly, four of the Justices believed the hindrance clause was proper-
ly implicated in this case. The extent to which they addressed the issue may
be of some precedential value in future cases. The issue has been left open for
future discussion, as the meaning of the hindrance clause remains undecided.
In contrast, the plurality slammed the door on the deprivation clause under §
1985(3). By refusing to extend its application to abortion protestors, the Court
narrowed the scope of § 1985(3) further than ever intended by the drafters.
This inexplicable restriction becomes even more mystifying considering that
the Court later extended an organized crime statute to the very same fact pat-
tern.
C. Racketeer hifluenced and Corrupt Organizations
The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, signed by President Nixon on
October 15, 1970, was heralded as a powerful weapon in the "war against
organized crime.""' Title IX of the Act, entitled "Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations" (RICO)," requires proof that a defendant, through a
pattern of racketeering, directly or indirectly invested in, maintained an interest
in, or participated in an enterprise, the activities of which affected interstate
commerce.92 Plaintiffs invoking civil RICO must also allege and prove that
an injury to their business or property occurred as a result of such activity.9"
An "enterprise" includes any "association, or other legal entity, and any union
or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity."94
85. I. at 781 (Stevens. J., dissenting), 800 (O'Connor. J., dissenting).
86. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 765.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 766.
89. i. at 767.
90. DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS. THE LAW OF CIVIL RICO 1-2 (1991).
91. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988).
92. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988).
93. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
94. 19 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988).
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"Racketeering activity" covers a wide range of crimes including "any act or
threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery [and]
extortion." 5 To establish a "pattern," a plaintiff must prove at least two pred-
icate acts.9"
At its inception, RICO was directed at the "infiltration of organized crime
and racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in interstate com-
merce." 7 Its civil remedy," however, has been applied in a variety of situa-
tions against a wide range of defendants, moving far beyond the originally
targeted mobster activity." The inclusion of a liberal construction clause"°°
lends support to RICO's wide application and broad interpretation.
With RICO's increased extension outside the context of organized crime,
courts and defendants sought ways to limit its use. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, has consistently discouraged such attempts. In its first civil RICO case,
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Inrex Co.,"' the Court refused to require a prior crimi-
nal conviction or an allegation of a special racketeering type injury. °2 The
Court recognized that "RICO is evolving into something quite different from
the original conception of its enactors,""' and approved the statute's broad
reach."
95. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988).
96. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988). Predicate acts are defined as individual criminal acts
that, when viewed together with evidence of other singular criminal acts, may constitute a
"pattern."
97. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 76 (1969); see also the Congressional State-
ment of Findings and Purpose prefacing RICO, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 tit. 9,
Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922-23 (1970), quoted in United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S.
576, 588-89 (1981) (holding that the purpose of the Act is "to seek the eradication of orga-
nized crime in the United States").
98. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) provides: "Any person injured in his business or property by
reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate
United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost
of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
99. Defendants have included "individuals, American and foreign corporations, partner-
ships, labor unions, receivers, churches, colleges and universities, municipal officials, munici-
pal corporations, estates, and political party organizations." ABRAMS, supra note 90, at 177-
79 (citations omitted); see also Arthur P. Breshnahan et al., Racketeer hIfluenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 847 (1993) (citations omitted) (stating that RICO
claims have included "corporate takeovers, securities regulations, banking, and insurance");
Geri J. Yonover, Fighting Fire With Fire: Civil RICO and Anti-Abortion Activists, 12
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 153 (1990) (citations omitted) (stating that RICO has been applied to
"copyright and licensing agreements, closely-held corporations, tax shelters, churning (securi-
ties fraud), tortious interference with a business, breach of contract, sexual harassment, family
disputes, and religious disputes").
100. Section 904 of title 9 of Pub. L. No. 91-452 provides in relevant part: "The pro-
visions of this title . . . shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes."
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (OCCA), tit. 9, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941
(1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988)).
101. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
102. Sedimna, 433 U.S. at 500; see also United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 593
(1981) (holding that RICO applies both to legitimate and illegitimate enterprises).
103. Sedinia, 473 U.S. at 500.
104. Id. at 499; see also HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 248
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The notion that a RICO claim must include proof that a defendant's ac-
tions were motivated by financial gain first emerged in the Eighth Circuit in
United States v. Anderson. 5 The court's primary goal was to keep separate
the "pattern" and "enterprise" elements."' In order to prevent two or more
predicate acts from automatically establishing evidence of an enterprise, the
court required that an enterprise be "directed towards an economic goal."' 7
Anderson was decided before the Supreme Court declaration of RICO's
breadth in Sedima. Even after Sedina, however, the Eighth Circuit adhered to
a restrictive reading of RICO in United States v. Flynn,' denying a convic-
tion absent an economic motive. In United States v. Ivic,"° the plaintiffs in-
voked RICO to address the terrorist activities of Croatian nationalists. In their
complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had committed two attempted
bombings and one attempted murder against advocates of Croatian indepen-
dence." ' The Second Circuit panel itself raised the question of economic
motivation at oral argument. The court was concerned about whether RICO
extended to such politically motivated acts in light of the statute's intended
purpose."' After the parties submitted additional briefs on the issue, the pan-
el concluded that the RICO enterprise or the predicate acts must have a finan-
cial purpose."2 Relying primarily on RICO's legislative history and Justice
Department Guidelines that narrowly targeted the "ill-gotten gains" of orga-
nized crime, the court found the defendants' acts were necessarily beyond the
scope of RICO."'
Ivic's narrow holding was undermined but not extinguished two and a half
months later by a different panel of the Second Circuit in United States v.
Bagaric."' Faced once again with the application of RICO to Croatian ter-
rorists, the panel rejected the contention that the prosecution must prove an
"ultimate and overriding economic motive." '' " While it was clear that the de-
fendants were motivated solely by their political beliefs, the court found predi-
cate acts involving the financial crime of extortion enough to show an "eco-
nomic dimension."
' 6
Five years later, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Northeast Women's
(1989) (commenting that "Itihe occasion for Congress' action was the perceived need to
combat organized crime. But Congress for cogent reasons chose to enact a more general
statute, one which, although it had organized crime as its focus, was not limited in applica-
tion to organized crime").
105. 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981).
106. Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1365-1369, 1372.
107. Id. at 1362.
108. 852 F.2d 1045, 1052 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 974 (1988).
109. 700 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1983).
110. ltic, 700 F.2d at 53-55.
Ill. Id. at 59-61.
112. Id. at 65.
113. id. at 64.
114. 706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840 (1983).
115. Bagaric, 706 F.2d at 53.
116. Id. at 57.
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Center v. McMonagle,"7 affirmed the district court's finding that twenty-
seven antiabortion protestors were liable for monetary damages under RICO.
The evidence at trial revealed that protestors had unlawfully entered the clinic
on four occasions, knocked down and injured several employees, and de-
stroyed medical equipment. This caused some employees to resign and the
Center to lose its lease."' In its complaint, the Center alleged extortion in
violation of the Hobbs Act"' involving threats of force, fear, and violence
designed to drive the Center out of business. 20 Proof of Hobbs Act vio-
lations serve as predicate acts required under RICO.'' Predicate acts, evi-
dence that the defendant has committed some crime, may ultimately be used in
combination with other evidence to show a large-scale operation. Because the
absence of economic motive is not a defense to Hobbs Act crimes, the court
reasoned by analogy that it was not necessary to prove an economic motive to
maintain a valid RICO claim. -'2 2 Two months later, the District Court for the
Western District of Washington, in Feminist Women's Health Center v. Rob-
erts, 21 followed McMonagle and expressly rejected the defendants' conten-
tion that RICO was inapplicable to the political acts of abortion protestors.
24
By injecting an economic motive requirement into RICO, the Eighth and
Second Circuit courts prescribed a narrow construction of RICO that was not
supported by any Supreme Court decision. The inconsistent justifications by
the two circuit courts for such a restricted reading and their inability to clarify
the scope of the requirement warranted further review. Establishing reliable
precedent with regard to the issue was crucial when it appeared that success or
failure of a civil RICO claim rested upon the question of economic motivation.
D. National Organization for Women v. Scheidler
1. Facts and Procedural History
In 1989, the National Organization for Women ("NOW")'25 along with
two women's health organizations, 21 sought stiff penalties under civil RICO
117. 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989).
118. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1345-46.
119. The Hobbs Act defines extortion as "the obtaining of property from another, with
his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or
under color of official right." 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1988).
120. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1345-47.
121. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(B) (1988).
122. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1350.
123. Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Roberts, No. C86-161Z, 1989 WL 56017 (W.D.
Wash. May 5, 1989).
124. Id. at *11.
125. NOW is an organization "which has a vital interest in women's rights to privacy
and reproductive freedom." It brought the action on behalf of itself, its members, and other
people who use or may use the services of women's health centers that provide abortions.
Brief for Petitioners at 5, National Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994) (No.
92-780).




to strike at the heart of nationally organized and violent abortion protests.
Defendants included Joseph Scheidler, founder of the Pro-Life Action League
("PLAL"), and Randall A. Terry, founder of Operation Rescue who, along
with other abortion opposers, comprised the Pro-Life Action Network
("PLAN").127 NOW claimed the defendants had violated § 1962 of RICO by
participating in a nationwide conspiracy to shut down abortion clinics through
a pattern of racketeering activity, specifically extortion under the Hobbs
Act. 12 The extortionate acts alleged included direct threats of personal harm
to clinic personnel and patients, arson and fire, burglary, criminal damage to
clinic property and equipment, and threats against the clinics' lessors, medical
laboratories, and suppliers.'29
The district court dismissed NOW's claims under § 1962 in part because
it concluded that donations from supporters could not be considered "income"
obtained by the defendants through a pattern of racketeering activity and in
part because it required proof of an economic motive." The court acknowl-
edged that the circuit courts were divided on the issue but followed the Sev-
enth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Neapolitan' which had adopted
the Eighth Circuit's definition in Anderson of an "enterprise" directed at an
economic goal.
12
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
ruling. 3 ' It agreed that the contributions defendants received from pro-life
supporters were not derived from a pattern of extortionate activity, despite
NOW's insistence that defendants' income increased in direct relation to the
frequency and notoriety of their efforts." 4 The court conceded that its deci-
sion in Neapolitan only indirectly imposed an economic motive
requirement."' s It also agreed with the finding in McMonagle that Hobbs Act
defendants need not profit economically from their extortionate acts." 6 Nev-
ertheless, the court examined Ivic, which it considered to be the leading case
on the issue, and adopted Ivic's narrow interpretation of the statute. It agreed
that according to its legislative history, RICO was intended to apply only in
the case of a financially motivated enterprise or series of predicate acts.'
RICO could not extend, therefore, to politically motivated entities or acts.
127. PLAN has organized an overall national strategy of "direct action" against clinics,
clinic staff, and patients. PLAN's activities include multi-city "blitzes." PLAN designated
1985-1986 as "the year of pain and fear" for anyone giving or receiving an abortion. Id. at
7.
128. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1988).
129. Petitioners' Brief at 4, Scheidler (No. 92-780).
130. National Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. 937, 941-43 (N.D. Ill. 1991),
aft'd, 968 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
131. 791 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1986).
132. Id. at 500.
133. National Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612. 630-31 (7th Cir. 1992), rev'd,
114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
134. I. at 623.
135. I. at 627.
136, hI. at 629-30.
137 Id. at 627.
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2. The Supreme Court's Unanimous Opinion
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Scheidler to resolve the disparity
among the circuit courts on the issue of economic motive.'38 It unanimously
concluded that neither the enterprise nor the predicate acts of RICO require
proof that the defendants were driven by financial gain.'39 In reversing the
Seventh Circuit Court's ruling, the Court first examined the statutory language.
It pointed out that an economic motive requirement is neither explicitly con-
tained in the language of § 1962 outlining prohibited conduct nor is it men-
tioned in any of the definitions in § 1961."4' While § 1962(c) imposes liabili-
ty when an enterprise engages in or affects interstate commerce, the Court
acknowledged that an enterprise could "affect" interstate commerce "without
having its own profit-seeking motives." 141
Dissecting the language of the statute even further, the Court demonstrat-
ed that the Seventh Circuit was wrong to graft an economic motive require-
ment onto § 1962(c) based on use of the term "enterprise" in §§ 1962 (a) and
(b) because the term plays a different role in each subsection. 42 Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, explained that "enterprise" in subsections
(a) and (b) correspond respectively to income derived from illegal activity or
money invested in illegal activity.'43 Subsection (c), however, is merely a
"vehicle" through which illegal activity is conducted."4 An enterprise, there-
fore, need only be an association which does in fact affect interstate commerce
through a pattern of racketeering. 4 ' Justice Rehnquist emphasized that re-
quiring predicate acts to have an economic motive ignores the possibility that
an enterprise, through its illegal conduct, may cause financial harm to a busi-
ness without creating any financial gain for itself.'46
The Court reaffirmed its decisions in both Sedina and H.J. Inc. v. North-
western Bell Telephone Co.,'47 advocating a broad reading of RICO in light
of the language chosen by Congress. Specifically, the Court reiterated a point
from United States v. Turkette18 that if Congress had intended RICO to be
more limited in scope, it could have done so by inserting a single word. In
response to the argument that the statement of congressional findings in the
note following § 1961 justified a restricted reading of RICO, the Court stated
that it is "a rather thin reed upon which to base a requirement ... neither
expressed nor, we think, fairly implied in the operative sections of the
138. National Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 800 (1994).
139. hI. at 806.






146. IdL at 805.
147. 492 U.S. 229 (1989).




Act."' 45 While it did not specifically address the weight given to administra-
tive law principles, the Court mentioned that the Department of Justice guide-
lines stating that a RICO enterprise must have an economic purpose had since
been amended to include "other identifiable goal[s]. ' ' °
The Court restated its holding in Sedina that the language of RICO,
which invites application beyond the context of organized crime, illustrates its
broad nature and does not call for clarification. 5' The Court consequently
found no need to analyze the bits of legislative history that the lower courts
found so persuasive in support of an economic element.12 For the same rea-
son, the Court declined to apply the rule of lenity, that is invoked only when
the language of a statute is ambiguous.'
The Court expressed no view, however, as to whether all the required
elements of RICO were met in the instant case. 54 It concluded only that an
economic motive was not necessary to maintain a valid claim. On remand to
the district court, NOW must still prove that the defendants participated in an
enterprise that affected interstate commerce through a pattern of racketeering.
3. The Concurring Opinion
Justice Souter, who wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice Kennedy
joined, emphasized that the majority opinion addressed a narrow legal question
and should not be interpreted to bar a First Amendment challenge to the appli-
cation of RICO in the context of political protest.' He indicated that impos-
ing an economic motive requirement might over-protect or under-protect free-
speech and was, therefore, not the proper avenue through which such concerns
should be pursued. 5 ' A better tactic, he suggested, would be to raise a First
Amendment challenge in defense of an individual RICO claim.' Finally,
Justice Souter delivered a warning to the courts to be cautious in applying
RICO where free speech may be an issue.'58
149. hI. at 805.
150. hI. (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE. 9 U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL 110.360 (1984)).
151. hi. at 806 (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985) (quot-
ing Harco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.. 747 F.2d 384, 398 (2d Cir. I11.))).
152. hI.
153. Id. The lenity rule provides that where there is ambiguity in the language of a
statute concerning multiple punishment, it should be resolved in favor of lenity in sentencing.
BLACKS LAW Dt-rIONARY 902 (6th ed. 1990).
154. Id.
155. hI. at 806 (Souter, J., concurring).
156. Id. at 807. Justice Souter explained that an economic motive requirement might
"keep RICO from reaching ideological entities whose members commit acts of violence we
need not fear chilling . . . but fully protected expression might fail the proposed economic-
motive test (for even protest movements need money)." Id.
157. hI. at 807. For a discussion of the potential conflict between RICO liability and the
First Amendment rights of abortion protestors, see Steven E. Soule & Karen R. Weinstein,
Racketeering, A,,ti-Abortion Protestors, and the First Amendotet, 4 UCLA WOMEN's L.J.
365 (1994).
158. Scheidler. 114 S. Ct. at 807.
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E. Reconciling Bray and Scheidler
On one level, the decision in Scheidler is not particularly remarkable. The
Supreme Court has consistently given RICO a wide reign. Scheidler is in line
with numerous cases that reject attempts to narrow application of the statute.
However, the Court's tacit approval of the extension of RICO to abortion
protestors, in light of its refusal to extend § 1985(3) of the Ku Klux Klan Act,
is somewhat anomalous.
1. The Harm Remedied
It is clear that the Supreme Court in Bray did not believe the KKK Act
was the proper federal remedy to address the violent efforts of antiabortion
protestors." 9 Protecting a woman's constitutional right to an abortion, how-
ever, is a logical application of a statute whose goal is to uphold equal protec-
tion of the laws. In contrast, the goal of RICO is to prevent organized entities
from using illegal means to harm a business. " ) The element in Scheidler that
allows RICO to encompass the acts of abortion protestors is the allegation of
an injury to plaintiffs business or property. This injury, however, was merely
incidental to the real harm caused by the protestors-preventing women's
access to abortion services. While the decision in Scheidler is certainly not an
unwelcome one for abortion rights proponents, questions remain on both sides
as to why the Court was so willing to extend liability under RICO in Scheidler
but not under the Ku Klux Klan Act in Bray.
2. The Group Targeted
The respective statutes were originally aimed at two very different types
of organized conspiracies. Section 1985(3) targeted the Ku Klux Klan, a group
motivated by race and politics. After suffering defeat in the war between the
states, the South gave birth to the KKK, a group comprised of former Con-
federate soldiers and former slave owners. 6' By whatever means necessary,
members of the Klan sought to reclaim their accustomed way of life. Their
efforts were aimed not only at blacks but at northern profit seekers and south-
ern sympathizers. 6 2 This fact alone repudiates the idea that § 1985(3) was
159. Bray was a 5-4 decision. Justice Scalia revealed the sharp division of the Court in
his venomous opinion, which took issue with every point made by the dissenting Justices
Stevens, Blackmun. and O'Connor. Had it not been for Justice Scalia's belief that abortion is
not a constitutionally protected right, the Court might have reached a different conclusion in
Bray'. See Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993). Justice Scalia
explicitly stated his belief that Roe v. Wade should be overturned in Webster v. Reproduc-
live Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989). In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
2791, 2873 (1992), he also expressed his view that the Constitution does not require states
to permit abortion.
160. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
161. Scott-McLaughlin, supra note 22 at 1364.
162. The term "carpetbaggers" was used to describe those people who descended from
the North seeking to rebuild the war-torn South. "'Scalawags" were native southerners who
sympathized with the new federal policies. Both were targeted by the Klan's campaign
against change in the South. Id.
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intended solely to remedy racial bias.' It also demonstrates that the Forty-
Second Congress intended to fashion a more general remedy that would pro-
tect the rights of all citizens against their political opposers."
RICO, by contrast, was originally aimed at mobsters, a group motivated
solely by economic gain. In 1967, the Task Force on Organized Crime estab-
lished by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice, reported that twenty-four crime families operated across the na-
tion. "' These intricate associations maneuvered outside the law to achieve
financial and political dominance. They gained profits through illegal gam-
bling, loan sharking, and the sale of narcotics." 6 They obtained power
through monopolization and extortion of legitimate businesses and bribery of
government officials."5 7 These criminals sought to put competitors out of
business solely to put more money in their own pockets, not because they
opposed a particular kind of business, its members, or its politics."'
In terms of intense political, moral, and social opposition, abortion protest
organizations align most closely with the Ku Klux Klan. Groups like Opera-
tion Rescue, the Pro-Life Action League, and Rescue America are motivated
primarily by their moral and political views. They oppose any constitutional
protection for a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy, just as the Klan
opposed constitutional protection for a slave's right to be free. Like the Klan,
opposers of choice seek, through whatever means necessary,"' to undo what
the Court did in Roe v. Wade.
When organized crime pressures a particular business owner in an attempt
to shut down his or her business, it is a purely profit motivated activity. Not
so for protestors whose ultimate goal is to shut down abortion clinics and
deprive women of their constitutional rights. Anti-choice activists seek to put
abortion providers out of business, but not for financial gain. Thus, it does not
make sense to stretch the provisions of RICO to cover acts based on political
163. While the Supreme Court has not directly limited § 1985(3) to racially motivated
conspiracies, it has implied such a limitation. Griffin, a case involving racial discrimination,
is the only instance where the Court has allowed application of the statute. See Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971). In addition, the Court in Carpenters placed the statute in
an historical context, making it less applicable to modern-day conspiracies when it charac-
terized the purpose of § 1985(3) narrowly "to combat the prevalent animus against Negroes
and their supporters." United Bhd. of Carpenters. Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825. 836
(1983).
164. See supra note 31.
165. TASK FORCE ON ORGANIZED CRIME, THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW EN-
FORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME 7
(1967).
166. /i. at 1.
167. Id. at 2.
168. "What organized crime wants is money and power." hi. at I.
169. Randall Terry, founder of Operation Rescue, is stepping tip efforts to bring about
his brand of change. He is building his own training center to raise tip "a cadre of people
who are militant, who are fierce, who are unmerciful." In addition, he plans to run for New
York State office in 1996. his goal being to "recapturlel the power bases from their current
tyrannical captors." Kio Stark. Call it Pro-Deth: Operation Rescne. TIHE NATION. Aug. 22.
1994. at 183.
1995]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
and social beliefs. Section 1985(3), however, was specifically designed to
remedy civil rights infringements of the very kind found in the antiabortion
context.
3. The Plain Meaning Approach and Stare Decisis
Justice Scalia emphasized a plain meaning approach when writing the
plurality opinion in Bray. This meant looking only to the "ordinary under-
standing of the words and structure of statutory text.' 170 Justice Scalia con-
sulted Webster's Dictionary for the plain meaning of "invidious," and conclud-
ed that such a word does not describe the mental state of abortion protestors
towards women in general. 7 In reaching his conclusion, Justice Scalia ef-
fectively precluded application of § 1985(31. The actual words of the statute,
however, do not contain any such language. The statute plainly states that it
prohibits a conspiracy "for the purpose of depriving" any person or class of
persons the equal protection of the laws.'72 In Bray, Justice Scalia was inter-
preting the language drafted by the Court in Griffin. 7 ' The Griffin Court,
however, added this limiting language in blatant disregard of the words al-
ready in place.
Additionally, § 1985(3) states quite clearly that the intended beneficiaries
of the statute include "any person or class of persons."'7 The word "any"
indicates that the statute should protect women seeking abortions as well as
blacks seeking employment. The Court in Griffin, however, limited protection
to those deprived of their rights based on race or "class."" ' The Supreme
Court has yet to determine what classes qualify for class-based discrimination
under this statute.
In Bray, Justice Scalia skirted this issue by finding that protestors' opposi-
tion to abortion did not translate into opposition to women in general. He
concluded that the protestors could not be liable under § 1985(3) since their
conspiracy was not aimed at any particular class. Such reasoning, however,
neglects that the conduct complained of interferes with every woman's right to
obtain abortion services.
Further, the people whose rights were being infringed upon in Bray in-
cluded not only women seeking abortions, but also the men and women who
provide the medical service. A plain meaning interpretation of the statute
would seem to protect anyone who was denied equal protection of the laws
based on political opposition. The Supreme Court, however, preferred to rely
170. Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning": Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict
Statiuto., Constrictmio,, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 401, 401 (1994).
171. He quoted the definition from Webster's as "It]ending to excite odium, ill will, or
envy; likely to give offense; esp., unjustly and irritatingly discriminating," Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753, 762 (1993) (quoting WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1306 (2d ed. 1954)).
172. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988).
173. A plaintiff must prove the conspirators acted with a "racial, or perhaps otherwise
class-based invidiously discriminatory animus." Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102.
174. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988).
175. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 103.
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upon its precedents and their distortion of the Act. Thus, in order to apply §
1985(3) in Bray, the Court was compelled to find a discriminatory animus
because of Griffin. It also had to find that the rights violated were protected
from private interference pursuant to Carpenters.
But was the Court truly bound by Griffin and Carpenters? The Court
claims to be committed to the doctrine of stare decisis.T "' But that commit-
ment is not absolute. The majority in Planned Parenthood v. Casey", fash-
ioned a test that allows the Court to overrule a prior decision if: I) it proves
unworkable in practice; 2) causes inequities in effect; 3) damages social sta-
bility; 4) is abandoned by society; and 5) relies on key fact assumptions which
have changed. Griffin itself did not adhere to the principle of stare decisis
when it eliminated the state action requirement, overruling Collins v.
Hardyrnan." ' Similarly, Carpenters mutated the statute and prior precedent
even further. If the purpose of stare decisis is to give the Court institutional
legitimacy through consistency, that purpose was not accomplished in this line
of cases.
The Court could have applied the test in Casey and concluded easily that
the requirements from Griffin and Carpenters rendered § 1985(3) unworkable
or inequitable in effect. The Court's narrow interpretation of § 1985(3) in
Bra)' may have complied with the elements laid out in Griffin and Carpenters,
but it is a far cry from the plain meaning of the statute or the intent of its
drafters. Thus, it seems fair to conclude that the majority in Bra) acted with
its own, or other, concerns in mind and failed to see the inequities created by
denying application of § 1985(3).
The Court also employed the plain meaning approach when it interpreted
the RICO statute in NOW v. Scheidler.'79 Justice Rehnquist, writing for a
unanimous court, quickly came to the conclusion that an economic motive
requirement was neither contained in the words nor could it be implied in the
structure of the statute.' 81' Aiding the Court in its decision were multudinous
prior decisions which had already broadened the reach of RICO. Perhaps that
is why it was so much easier for the Court to extend a remedy to the victims
of violent protest in Scheidler, whereas in Bray prior case law severely nar-
rowed the statute in question.
The Court may also have found the issue in Scheidler simpler to resolve
because it was not dispositive. The plaintiffs must still prove all elements of a
RICO conspiracy at the trial level. The initial decision on the merits and the
accompanying criticism would be shouldered by the trial court. Further, per-
haps, the Supreme Court saw Scheidler as a concession for its poor judgment
176. Stare decisis was the primary justification for the Court's holding in Casev. See
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2808 (1992); see also Ronald Kahn. The
Supreme Court As a (Counter) Majoritarian histitution: Misperceptions of the Warren, Bur-
ger, and Relinquist Courts, 1994 DET. C.L. REV. 1.
177. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
178. 341 U.S. 651 (1951), overruled by Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
179. 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
180. I. at 803-05.
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in Bray. After its decision in Bray, the Court was severely criticized,' clinic
violence continued to escalate, and there was a heightened demand for practi-
cal solutions. Scheidler, therefore, may be viewed as not merely the reaction
of a conservative court, but as a compromising gesture and an attempt to quell
the suspicion that Justices allow their individual opinions on the abortion issue
to enter into the decision-making process.
II. BALANCING CLINIC PROTECTION AND FIRST AMENDMENT FREE SPEECH
A. The Standard Applied in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.
In Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.,"8 2 the Supreme Court con-
sidered the constitutionality of a permanent injunction issued by a Florida state
court to restrain antiabortion demonstrations. In 1991, a Florida clinic sought
protection for its patients, personnel, and property when demonstrations aimed
at shutting down the clinic became too disruptive."5 3 The Florida state court
issued a permanent injunction in September of 1992 which prohibited the pro-
testors from "blocking or interfering with public access to the clinic, and from
physically abusing persons entering or leaving the clinic."' "& This general re-
striction served only to escalate protest activity.' In response, the clinic
sought another injunction to address specific protest activities. The Florida
district court issued a broader and more explicit injunction on April 8, 1993.
Antiabortion activists Judy Madsen and Shirley Hobbs challenged five
provisions of the amended injunction which restricted their protest activities.
The challenged provisions included: 1) 36-foot clinic buffer zone - prohibiting
protestors from demonstrating within 36 feet of clinic property; 2) noise -
prohibiting, during hours of operation, "singing, chanting, whistling, shouting,
yelling, us[ing] bullhorns, auto horns, sound amplification equipment or other
181. See Randolph M. Scott-McLaughlin, Operation Rescue Versus A Woman's Right to
Choose: A Conflict Without A Federal Reniedv?, 32 DuQ. L. REV. 709 (1994); Banks supra,
note 48; Todd C. Coleman, Casenote, Hindering The Applicability of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) to
Abortion Protests: Bray v. Alexandria Women'a Health Clinic, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 525
(1994); Toni Driver, Casenote, Federal Law -Civil Rights-Individuals Obstructing Ingress
aiid Egress to Abortion Facilities Do Not Violate A Woman's Federal Rights Within 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3), 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 753 (1994); J. Paige Lambdin, Note, Civil
Rights-Abortion Protests-42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) Does Not Provide A Federal Cause of Ac-
tion Against Protestors Who Obstruct Access to Abortion Clinics-Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 2096 (1993).
182. 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
183. See Respondent's Brief at I, Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 114 S. Ct.
2516 (1994) (No. 93-880).
184. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2521.
185. "In the months following the September 1992 injunction, the Clinic suffered a De-
cember 1992 butyric acid attack; the Clinic doors were disabled with super glue; the doctor
serving the Clinic received threats including a mock shooting . . . and focused residential
picketing against the Clinic staff continued." Respondent's Brief at 3, Madsen (No. 93-880).
In addition, the Melbourne police testified to the increase in protest activity, its overflow into
the street, and protestors' disregard for police warnings. Id. at 7.
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sounds .. within earshot of the patients inside the Clinic."; 3) observable
images - prohibiting the use of signs which could be seen inside the clinic; 87
4) no approach zone - prohibiting protestors from "physically approaching any
person seeking the services of the Clinic unless such person indicates a desire
to communicate.";' and 5) 300-foot residential buffer zone - prohibiting
protestors from demonstrating within 300 feet of the residences of "employees,
staff, owners or agents."' 89 The Florida Supreme Court upheld the injunc-
tion "' while the Eleventh Circuit, in a concurrent challenge, struck it down
as an unconstitutional infringement on protestors' First Amendment right of
free speech.' 9' The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the dis-
pute.192
In its opinion, the Court first explained why the injunction was not con-
tent or viewpoint based and therefore did not warrant a strict scrutiny analysis
as urged by the petitioners.9 3 The Court stated that an injunction, by its very
nature, targets a specific group of people based on that group's past behav-
ior.'' Whether an injunction is content or viewpoint based, however, de-
pends upon the purpose of the court in issuing the order. The Florida state
court adopted the restriction in response to the protestors' violation of the
original order, not because of their antiabortion message. 9 The injunction
was, therefore, content-neutral.
The Court next distinguished a content-neutral injunction from a content-
neutral statute, the former being a remedy "imposed for violations (or threat-
ened violations) of a legislative or judicial decree,"'" and the latter a "legis-
lative choice regarding the promotion of particular societal interests.""' 9 The
constitutionality of a content-neutral statute, which restricts free speech in a
public forum, normally requires a court to apply the intermediate scrutiny
standard from Ward v. Rock Against Racism.9 ' Under this standard, a court
evaluates whether the restriction on speech is "justified without reference to
the content of the regulated speech, [is] narrowly tailored to serve a significant
186. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2522.
187. The protestors were known to prop ladders against the Clinic's 8-foot privacy fence
and hold up signs within view of patients inside the clinic. Respondent's Brief at 4, Madsen
(No. 93-880).
188. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2522.
189. I.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 2523.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 2523 (referring to Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,
460 U.S. 37. 45 (1983)).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 2523-24. "Our principal inquiry in determining content neutrality is whether
the government has adopted a regulation of speech 'without reference to the content of the
regulated speech."' Id. at 2523 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791
(1989)).
196. Id. at 2524.
197. id.
198. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
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government interest, and ... leave[s] open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information.'"
The Court in Madsen, however, was concerned that a content-neutral
injunction has a greater potential to discriminate. Therefore, the Court sought
to apply First Amendment principles more strictly than those embodied in the
intermediate scrutiny standard. It announced a new standard whereby the con-
stitutionality of a content-neutral injunction requires a finding that its restric-
tions "bUrden[ed] no more speech than necessary to serve a significant govern-
mental interest.""' The Court agreed with the Florida Supreme Court that
the injunction in Madsen was intended to serve three significant governmental
interests: 1) to protect "a woman's freedom to seek lawful medical or counsel-
ing services in connection with her pregnancy;" 2 2) to ensure "public safety
and order, in promoting the free flow of traffic on public streets and side-
walks, and in protecting the property rights of all its citizens; '2112 and 3) to
protect residential privacy.-" These interests were then weighed against that
of the protestors in exercising their right to freedom of expression guaranteed
by the First Amendment.
The Court applied this balancing test to each challenged provision of the
injunction. First, it upheld the 36-foot buffer zone around clinic entrances. The
Court found the denial of potentially peaceful protest in that area was out-
weighed by the need to protect ingress to and egress from the clinic and pro-
tect the free flow of traffic on the street in front of the clinic.2"4 The Court
relied on facts in the record indicating that large numbers of protestors could
significantly block the entrances to the clinic even though their actions were
peaceful.' 5 In addition, the Court reasoned that the first, less restrictive in-
junction, failed to maintain adequate access to the facility. According to the
Court, however, the buffer zone could not permissibly include private property
on the back and side of the clinic.2 ' The record indicated that protest activi-
ties in those areas neither interfered with access to the clinic nor interrupted
traffic on the adjoining street.2 7 Thus, a restriction including those areas bur-
dened more speech than necessary to serve the interest of maintaining access
to the facility.
2'8 s
The Court also upheld the noise restriction, finding that the health center,
like any medical facility, requires a comfortable and quiet atmosphere for its
patients. Similar noise restrictions had previously been upheld as reasonable by
the Court, based on the nature of the area in question. ° In Madsen, the
199. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (citations omitted).
200. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2525.
201. Id. at 2526.
202. hI.
203. Id.
204. hI. at 2527.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 2528.
207. 1i.
208. I.
209. Id. "ITIhe nature of a place, 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the kinds
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Court reasoned that "[t]he First Amendment does not demand that patients at a
medical facility undertake Herculean efforts to escape the cacophony of politi-
cal protests. 2 " ' The noise restriction, therefore, was a necessary burden on
protestors' speech. With regard to observable images, however, the Court
found "it is much easier for the clinic to pull its curtains than for a patient to
stop up her ears." ' t' As such, a restriction on images observable from clinic
windows was an unnecessary burden on the protestors' speech.
Next, the Court invalidated both the provision prohibiting protestors from
engaging in uninvited communication with persons entering the clinic and the
provision prohibiting demonstrations within 300 feet of the personal residences
of clinic staff. Both restrictions were found to restrict peaceful protest beyond
that necessary to maintain clinic access and residential privacy. The Court
explained that when a topic is a subject of heated public debate, people "must
tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate
breathing space to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment." 2 2 While
the Court indicated it might have upheld a smaller buffer zone around staff
residences, a 300 foot zone was too broad and not justified by the facts in the
record.2"
Madsen is important because it recognizes injunctions as a means of ad-
dressing violence at abortion clinics. It demonstrates that even those on the
Court who oppose abortion are unwilling to permit unlawful protest. Despite
the Court's ruling in NOW v. Scheidler,2 " RICO has proved to be an illusory
solution to the problem of day-to-day protest activities. Madsen, however,
offers definitive and immediate protection for abortion clinics, patients, and
personnel. In addition, the majority demonstrated a respect for the rights of
both parties. The decision indicated that neither a woman seeking an abortion
nor protestors seeking to express their viewpoint may exercise their right to
the exclusion of the other. Many saw Madsen as a sound compromise.2
Others, however, believed the Supreme Court had gone too far in restricting
the free speech of protestors.2 6
of regulations . . . that are reasonable." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116
(1972). For an analysis of Supreme Court opinions addressing noise restrictions, see Richard
E. Guida, Note, Constitutional Law-First Amnedn'nt Freedom of Speech-Statute Prohibit-
ing "oud and Unseenl'" Noises is a Content-Neutral Regulation of Protected Speech, 20
U. BALT. L. REV. 507 (1991) (pointing out that the Supreme Court generally upholds regula-
tion of amplified speech if necessary to protect the public from noise).
210. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2528.
211. id. at 2529.
212. Id. at 2529 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988)).
213. Id. at 2530.
214. 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
215. See. e.g., Joan Biskupic, Court Allows Abortion Clinic Buffer Zones Scalia Sees
Threat to Free Speech Rights, WASH. POST. Jul. I, 1994, at Al; Aaron Epstein, Court Backs
Restrictions on Protestors It Upheld, 6-3, A Florida Judge's Rling Against Anti-Abortion
Demonstrators. Scalia Decried the Decision as "A Ponerfli Loaded Weapon", PHILA. IN-
QUIRER. Jul. I. 1994. at A3.
216. See Epstein, supra note 215.
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B. The First Amendment Inplications of Madsen
Justice Scalia, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Kennedy and
Thomas, attacked the standard developed in Madsen and accused the majority
of making yet another exception in the context of abortion.21 '7 The entire de-
cision, in Justice Scalia's view, was "profoundly at odds with [the Court's]
First Amendment precedents and traditions . 2 8 He advocated strict
scrutiny of any injunction mainly because be believed such a restriction on
speech is as likely to intentionally discriminate against a particular viewpoint
as is a content-based statute. In Justice Scalia's opinion, the Court should have
evaluated whether the injunction's restriction on speech was "necessary to
serve a compelling state interest and ... narrowly drawn to achieve that
end." ' 211 Justice Scalia primarily contended that the 36-foot buffer zone,
which included a public sidewalk area, was an impermissible restriction on the
protestors' right of free expression. Because he believed the record did not
reflect sufficient violence or attempts to prevent patient entry into the clin-
ic, 22' Justice Scalia did not understand the majority's willingness to curtail
the protestors' activities in any way. He likened the demonstrations in Madsen
to civil rights protests22 ' and implied that the Court's decision could support
future restrictions on social protest with little or no findings of fact.
222
Justice Scalia's disagreement with the majority in Madsen is illustrative of
a current debate among First Amendment scholars. There are those who would
leave speech mostly deregulated and others who Professor Kathleen M.
Sullivan terms the "new speech regulators.12 2 1 Professor Sullivan argues that
the new speech regulators blur distinctions created by modern free speech doc-
trine. 24 For example, where the modern free speech consensus draws a line
between pure speech and speech as conduct, allowing regulation only of the
latter, the new speech regulators would equate some pure speech with physical
assault. 2-  By upholding the noise restriction, the Madsen Court demonstrat-
ed some accord with the view of the new speech regulators. The Clinic argued
that antiabortion speech outside the clinic caused patients to display physical
symptoms of anxiety, requiring increased doses of sedation.22 '6 The Court re-
jected this equation of speech with physical harm in its refusal to restrict pro-
testors from shouting their message or approaching patients entering the clinic.
The Court did, however, find that once inside the clinic, restriction of a bull-
217. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2535 (J. Scalia dissenting).
218. hi.
219. Id. at 2537 (quoting Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
220. Id.
221. /d. at 2542.
222. /i. at 2550.
223. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Lecture. Free Speech Wars, 48 SMU L. REV. 203, 206
(1994).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 209; e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993) (arguing that
pornography sexualizes male dominance and is a harm in itself).
226. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2521.
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horned message is necessary "to ensure the health and well-being of the pa-
tients." 2' 7 This demonstrates a nod towards the view that pure speech may be
regulated in some instances when it is thought to create physical harm.
In addition, the new speech regulators would have the courts focus more
upon the "effect" of a restriction on speech than on the "purpose" of the re-
striction. Currently, the Supreme Court will generally uphold a content-neutral
restriction on speech and strike down a content-based restriction. Professor
Cass Sunstein points out, however, that some restrictions on a particular view-
point may not be as damaging as a blanket ban on speech. -28 Professor
Sunstein cites a public university prohibition on a narrow category of racial
hate speech as an example of an acceptable content-based restriction.2" In
contrast, a restriction on all speech in airports, train stations, and bus terminals
would be an impermissible restriction of the fora in which speech can take
place.2"" Professor Sunstein argues for a less mechanical application of First
Amendment principles.
The majority in Madsen seemed to follow this line of thinking. Whereas
Justice Scalia would have the Court routinely characterize an injunction as a
content-based restriction, the majority in Madsen undertook a more thoughtful
approach. It refused to automatically classify all injunctions as content-based
just because they enjoin the activities of a single group. On the other hand, the
majority acknoovledged that because injunctions always target a particular
group, they could potentially be used to stifle a particular viewpoint. The
majority, therefore, fashioned a stricter content-neutral standard and then eval-
uated each section of the injunction individually to assess its effect on the
parties. With each provision, the Court asked, what will happen to protestors if
this restriction is included and what will happen to clinic personnel and pa-
tients if it is not? Adoption of the limited 36-foot buffer zone reflects such an
analysis. The Court upheld a 36-foot restriction in order to maintain access to
the clinic, but struck down portions around the clinic where protest activity did
not obstruct an entrance to the clinic. Such a fact-driven decision-making
process has the potential to create a more just outcome. It does not, however,
produce meaningful guidelines for those similarly situated.
The majority in Madsen may disagree with some of the opinions advanced
by the new speech regulators. It is interesting, however, to see how a recent
Supreme Court decision incorporates elements of their philosophy. First
Amendment law, in Justice Scalia's view, has been forever marred by the
decision in Madsen. This decision may, however, mark a necessary change in
the way we view freedom of speech. The availability of a post-injury remedy
for patients and clinic personnel may not be enough in the context of abortion
protest where peaceful picketing has given rise to clinic invasions, personal
assault, and even murder. The Court cannot choose freedom of speech over
227. I. at 2528.
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freedom of choice or vice versa. Placing some restriction on protestors'
speech, while refusing to shield recipients from their message, however, en-
courages respect for differing viewpoints. Achievement of such a compromise
could end violence in the on-going debate over abortion.
C. Post-Madsen Decisions
As mentioned above, the Court in Madsen paid particular attention to the
facts of the case. It evaluated the specific instances of conduct in relation to
the restriction sought. While the Court's analysis may have produced a sound
result in Madsen, it provides only a vague guideline for district judges in
crafting permissible injunctions and for courts of appeal in evaluating them.
1. Demonstrations On and Around Clinic Property
On October 31, 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated a California Su-
preme Court's judgment regarding an injunction aimed at abortion protestors,
and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Madsen. In
Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc. v. Williams, t the California Su-
preme Court upheld2'2 a portion of an injunction restricting "all picketing,
demonstrating or counseling to the public sidewalk across the street from the
clinic building."2- Only that particular provision of the injunction was re-
viewed by the California Court and considered by the U.S. Supreme
Court.2  The California Supreme Court determined, as had the U.S. Supreme
Court in Madsen, that the injunction is a content-neutral restriction.23 The
California Court, however, applied the intermediate scrutiny standard estab-
lished for content-neutral statutes 216 that the U.S. Supreme Court enumerated
in Ward v. Rock Against Racism.2" In upholding the sidewalk restriction, it
identified the "health and safety of the clinic's patients" as a significant gov-
ernmental interest.2 "8 This is in accord with the governmental interests identi-
fied in Madsen.
On remand, however, the Shasta-Diablo court is required to re-evaluate
the restriction under the stricter Madsen standard, to determine whether the
restriction burdens more speech than necessary to serve the identified signifi-
231. 873 P.2d 1224 (Cal. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 413 (1994). In granting cer-
tiorari, the United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded the California Supreme Court
opinion for further consideration in light of Madsen.
232. Id. at 1226.
233. Id. at 1227-28.
234. Id. at 1228.
235. Id. at 1229.
236. Id.
237. The standard allows "reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of pro-
tected speech, provided the restrictions 'are justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest,
and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information."'
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (internal cites omitted).
238. Shasta-Diablo, 873 P.2d at 1230.
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cant government interest. Because the sidewalk restriction in Shasta-Diablo is
very similar to the 36-foot buffer zone upheld in Madsen, the California Court
is likely to uphold the sidewalk restriction with only slight modification.
Madsen upheld a 36-foot buffer zone, but only around the entrances and drive-
ways where, as shown by evidence in the record, protest activity had often
prevented access to the clinic. In addition, the Court in Madsen refused to
uphold portions of the buffer zone that extended into private property where
protest activity had not proven to be disruptive. Similarly, the California Court
in Shasta-Diablo may uphold the sidewalk restriction only in areas where evi-
dence shows that protest activity prevents access to the clinic or disrupts the
free flow of traffic.
In the U.S. Courts of Appeal, both the D.C. and Second Circuits have
followed Madsen in deciding the constitutionality of injunctions that restrict
the speech of abortion protestors. In Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck,2- the
Second Circuit struck down a bubble-zone provision that prohibited all demon-
strations within fifteen feet of clinic entrances and driveways and within fif-
teen feet of all persons and vehicles seeking access to the facility. The provi-
sion did allow two demonstrators at a time to enter the bubble zone for the
purpose of sidewalk "counseling." '4 The court found the fifteen foot radius
was well within the bounds of Madsen24' and the exception for two sidewalk
counselors was an acceptable way to prevent a complete ban on expres-
sion.24 2 The provision would, however, prohibit standing on the sidewalk
with a sign, when it did not obstruct or impede access to the clinic. 41 In ad-
dition, the record failed to reflect significant disregard of a prior court or-
der 2-44 as was the case in Madsen. The bubble zone in Schenck, therefore,
was too broad a restriction on constitutionally protected expression.241
The court in Schenck also invalidated a provision that required protestors
to "cease and desist" counseling people who approach the clinic, reject the
counseling, and turn to walk away. 246 The court found that while this provi-
sion was less restrictive than its "no approach" counterpart in Madsen because
it allowed a counselor to approach a potential listener, the provision neverthe-
less allowed the potential listener "to control the prospective counselor's op-
portunity to engage in protected expression." 42 It therefore violated the idea
239. 1994 WL 480642 (2nd Cir. Sep. 6. 1994). The opinion was initially reported at 34
F.3d 130 (2nd Cir. 1994) but was withdrawn from the bound volume pending an en banc
poll.
240. The term "sidewalk counselor" is somewhat misleading. Anti-abortion "counselors"
approach women entering abortion facilities with the goal of persuading them not to have an
abortion. See, e.g., Alan F. Brownstein & Stephen M. Hankins, Pruning Pruneyard: Limiting
Free Speech Rights Under State Constitutions on the Property of Private Medical Clinics
Providing Abortion Services, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1073 n.] (1991).
241. Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck, 1994 WL 480642 at *9.
242. hI.
243. Id.
244. hi. at *9-10.
245. I. at *10.
246. Id.
247. Id. at *11.
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established in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwe1 248 that we must sometimes
tolerate outrageous speech in order to maintain First Amendment freedom.
In National Organization for Women v. Operation Rescue,249 the D.C.
Circuit upheld the first portion of an injunction that prohibited protestors from
"trespassing on, blockading, impeding or obstructing access to or egress from
any facility at which abortions, family planning, or gynecological services are
performed in the District of Columbia." 2'0 It remanded for modification the
second portion of the injunction that prohibited "inducing, encouraging, direct-
ing, aiding, or abetting others" to violate the first provision.25' The court
found the injunction to be content-neutral, identified virtually the same signifi-
cant governmental interests as in Madsen, and then applied the "burden no
more speech than necessary" standard. 22
The court upheld the first provision because trespassing and blocking
access to private property have been established by the Supreme Court as
illegal conduct not protected by the First Amendment.2" This provision is
particularly noteworthy for two reasons. First, it accomplishes essentially the
same goal as the thirty-six foot buffer zone in Madsen by maintaining access
to the medical facility. The provision does not, however, restrict the expression
of a protestor holding a sign outside the clinic who is not blocking access to
an entrance or driveway. Presumably, though, if this injunction does not suc-
ceed in deterring clinic blockades, the district court could create a buffer zone
similar to that in Madsen. Second, unlike the injunction in Madsen, which
involved a particular abortion clinic, the injunction in NOW v'. Operation Res-
cue covers the entire District of Columbia. Such a distinction was not dis-
cussed in Madsen but could be important for other cities drafting similar in-
junctions or ordinances. Other courts might rule that such a regional restriction
on speech is not narrowly tailored and therefore unconstitutional.
In reviewing the second provision, the D.C. Circuit Court ultimately relied
on Madsen. Operation Rescue's primary concern was that the terms "inducing"
and "encouraging" are broad enough to include the ordinary fundraising and
organizing activities which facilitate permissible demonstrations but might also
ultimately involve prohibited activity.2' The record of the district court,
however, indicated that it meant to prohibit protestors from "inciting" unlawful
acts.2"5 The D.C. Circuit Court agreed that "inducing" and "encouraging"
were impermissibly vague but that use of the term "inciting" would make the
248. 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).
249. 37 F.3d 646 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
250. I/. at 649.
251. M.
252. Id. at 655.
253. hL; see Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 568 (1971) (holding there is no First
Amendment right to trespass on private property); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555
(1965) (holding there is no right to block physically access to private property as a means
of protest).
254. National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 37 F.3d at 656.
255. 1i. at 657.
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prohibition clear .2 " As the injunction's vague terms created an unnecessary
burden on protestors' speech, the court remanded that portion of the order to
the district court with instructions to remove the vague terms and insert the
word "inciting," which more clearly expressed the district court's inten-
tions.-11
2. Residential Picketing
The U.S. Supreme Court first addressed residential picketing by abortion
protestors in Frisby v. Schultz.258 After much controversy over antiabortion
demonstrations outside the home of an abortion doctor, the town of
Brookfield, Wisconsin adopted an ordinance that completely banned picketing
"before or about" any residence.259 The Supreme Court recognized that the
government has a significant interest in protecting residential privacy, as
"[pireserving the sanctity of the home, the one retreat to which men and wom-
en can repair to escape from the tribulations of their daily pursuits, is surely
an important value."' The Court, however, upheld a limited interpretation
of the restriction, finding that to "fall within the scope of the ordinance the
picketing must be directed at a single residence. '26' This meant protestors
could continue to terrorize a particular resident. They merely had to picket up
and down the entire block rather than in the area directly in front of the
resident's home. Their activities would then cease being "focused" and be-
come a "more generally directed means of communication" which, according
to Frisby, may not be completely banned in residential areas. Such a narrow
holding restrained the spatial reach of the ordinance and cast doubt on the
future ability of municipalities to remedy the harms associated with residential
picketing.2'62
In Madsen, the Court addressed the constitutionality of a restriction on
picketing in residential neighborhoods. The injunction at issue in Madsen
placed a blanket ban on picketing within 300 feet of the residences of clinic
staff. While recognizing the need to maintain privacy of the home, the Court
found a 300 foot buffer zone to be much broader than necessary to achieve
that goal.263 In addition, the prohibited zone was much larger than the "fo-
cused picketing" ban in Frisby.2' The Court advised, however, that a smaller
zone and less restrictive ban on the time of picketing, the duration of pickets,
and the number of picketers might be upheld if supported by sufficient evi-
256. I. at 656.
257. i. at 658.
258. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
259. Id. at 476.
260. hI. at 484 (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980)).
261. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 483.
262. See The Supreme Court 1987 Tern,-Residential Picketing, 102 HARV. L. REV. 261
(1988) (concluding that the Court failed to enunciate an ascertainable test for lower courts to
follow).
263. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2530.
264. hi. at 2529-30.
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dence.2" Unfortunately, the Court did not specify what kind and how much
evidence would be necessary to support a particular restriction.2'  The Su-
preme Court subsequently granted certiorari on a New Jersey Supreme Court
decision that upheld a 300 foot residential picketing ban.
In Murray v. Lawson,26 7 the Court vacated and remanded the decision of
the New Jersey Supreme Court 68 for further consideration in light of
Madsen. After Dr. Elrick Murray, an abortion doctor, became the target of
antiabortion protest at his home, a court in the New Jersey Chancery Division
issued a permanent injunction banning protestors from "picketing in any form
including parking, parading or demonstrating in any manner, within 300 feet
of the Murray residence." 9 Both the New Jersey Appellate Division and the
New Jersey Supreme Court initially upheld the 300 foot restriction. On
remand, after reviewing Madsen, the New Jersey Supreme Court amended the
original injunction to allow picketing up to 100 feet of the Murray's property
line, in a group of no more than ten persons, for one hour every two weeks,
with twenty-four hour notice to the local police department.:1
The New Jersey Supreme Court first rejected the protestors' argument that
the entire injunction was a "'prior restraint' on speech and thus presumptively
unconstitutional.2 72 The court explained that a prior restraint generally in-
volved "administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain communications
when issued in advance of the time that such communications are to oc-
cur." The U.S. Supreme Court had summarily disposed of this issue in
Madsen, by pointing out that every injunction that incidentally affects speech
is not necessarily a prior restraint.2 7 Because a buffer zone only partially
restrained the protestors' message, as they were free to voice it in a variety of
265. I. at 2530.
266. The Court added to this confusion when it denied certiorari in Winfield v. Kaplan,
114 S. Ct. 2783 (1994), on the same day it issued its opinion in Madsen. Winfield involved
an identical 300 foot ban on residential picketing. In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices
Kennedy and Thomas, Justice Scalia explained that the Court deferred disposition on Winfield
until a final decision was reached in Madsen. Incredulously, the majority of the Court de-
cided not to vacate and remand the case for further consideration in light of the judgment in
Madsen, but rather to deny certiorari. Justice Scalia surmised that because the injunction in
Winfield was only temporary, the Court majority must have presumed the North Carolina
court would follow Madsen in issuing the permanent order. This still left a question, Justice
Scalia argued, as to why the Court did not deny certiorari initially. hi. at 2783.
267. 115 S. Ct. 44 (1994).
268. Murray v. Lawson, 642 A.2d 338 (N.J. 1993), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 44 (1994).
269. Murray v. Lawson. 649 A.2d 1253, 1257 (N.J. 1994), cert. denied, No. 94-1450.
1995 WL 94168 (May 30, 1995).
270. Id. at 1255.
271. Id. at 1268.
272. hI. at 1261. The protestors based their argument on a footnote in Madsen. That
footnote indicated that the injunction in Madsen was issued because of unlawful conduct, not
because of the content of the expression. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524 n.2.
273. Murray, 649 A.2d at 1261 (quoting Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766,
2771 (1993)).
274. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524 n.2.
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other ways, the restriction was not an impermissible prior restraint.-7 The
New Jersey Supreme Court adopted this reasoning from Madsen and pointed
out that the protestors were not prohibited from leafletting, canvassing, and
picketing outside the buffer zone in the Murrays' neighborhood. 7 ' In addi-
tion, the court denied that the injunction was aimed at the content of the
protestors' message, as picketing in front of the Murray residence for any pur-
pose would violate the Murrays' privacy.277
After making these initial findings, the New Jersey Supreme Court pro-
ceeded to apply the Madsen test to the 300 foot restriction. The court first
looked at the evidence offered in Madsen to support the 300 foot zone. Rea-
soning that more evidence than in Madsen was necessary to justify such a re-
striction, the New Jersey Supreme Court compared its record to that of
Madsen. '7 Here, the record reflected that the trial judge engaged in a rigor-
ous inquiry. He viewed a videotape, looked at pictures of the protests, and
heard live testimony in evaluating the request for injunctive relief.279 In addi-
tion, he personally examined the Murrays' neighborhood and consulted the
town tax map in determining how to design the injunction.
280 The court concluded that the record developed by the trial judge
clearly supported some sort of buffer.28 It chose to shorten the distance from
300 to 100 feet because at that distance, the protestors would still be visible a
lot-and-a-half away, but inside their home the Murrays would no longer feel
imprisoned. 8 " Limiting the number of picketers to ten prevented the Murrays
from feeling besieged and assured the protestors that their picketing would be
taken seriously.' Allowing picketing once every two weeks for one hour
gave protestors the opportunity to communicate their message without subject-
ing the Murrays to a constant barrage."' The New Jersey Supreme Court
ultimately concluded that the modified injunction allowed the protestors to
communicate their message effectively while still affording protection to the
Murrays.
11
Murray is a reasonable interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision
regarding residential picketing in Madsen. The opinion in Madsen, however,
gave little guidance beyond its finding that a 300 foot buffer was too broad
and that sufficient evidence was necessary to justify any restriction. Neverthe-
less, the New Jersey Supreme Court aptly applied the enumerated standard and
revised the restriction to effect a better balance of first amendment freedoms
with the residential right of privacy. Murray may be instructive for future
275. Id.
276. Murray, 649 A.2d at 1262.
277. /i. at 1263.
278. Id. at 1264.
279. Id. at 1266.
280. Id. at 1265-66.
281. Id. at 1268.
282. Id. at 1268.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. hI. at 1268.
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cases, but decisions in this area will likely remain subjective as they are heavi-
ly fact-driven. The New Jersey decision is nevertheless important because it
gives more definition to Frisby's concept of focused picketing and maintains
injunctive relief as a way to prevent social protest from invading the privacy
of the home.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has subsequently
reviewed a city ordinance identical to that in Frisby. The majority decision in
Vittitow v. City of Upper Arlington,286 issued January 12, 1995, calls the dic-
tates of both Frisby and Madsen into question. Plaintiffs were abortion pro-
testors who sought an injunction to prevent the City of Arlington from enforc-
ing a city ordinance that prohibited picketing "before or about the residence or
dwelling of any individual ...."2"7 The district court issued an injunction
enjoining the city from enforcing the ordinance as written, but provided for
conditional enforcement which, in effect, imposed a counter-injunction on
protestors' activities. The injunction prohibited picketers from stopping or
gathering "in front of or around any residence" '288 and from giving "undue
emphasis to directing their activities to one residence." 289 After further re-
view, however, the district court modified the order sua sponte to prevent
protestors from "picketing in front of: (a) the doctor's home, and (b) the two
homes on either side of the doctor's home," as well as "the home of anyone
[the city has] probable cause to believe is the target, focus or subject of the
picketing, as well as ... the two homes on either side of the home just de-
scribed. , ' - "
The Sixth Circuit Court reviewed this ordinance and injunction in light of
its understanding of Frisby and Madsen. The court interpreted Madsen to
clearly make suspect if not prohibit, "any linear extension beyond the area
'solely in front of a particular residence."' 2'9 While the city of Arlington
used language identical to that upheld in Frisby, the Sixth Circuit admonished
the city for doing so, as only a narrow interpretation of the Frisby ordinance
was ultimately upheld.2 '92 The court pointed out that the local police would
find a violation when it thought one residence was being targeted. This would
be incorrect, according to the Sixth Circuit, because every picket will have a
target and "only focused picketing taking place solely in front of a particular
residence is prohibited."29 The court distinguished this case and those such
as Murray, where the victim of residential picketing seeks the injunction. In
the latter case, the court conceded, "the trial judge rightfully undertakes to
define the rights of the parties in an appropriately worded injunction, if an
injunction is called for."2" Here, however, the court, feeling restrained by
286. 43 F.3d I100 (6th Cir. 1995).
287. Id. at 1101.
288. Id. at 1102.
289. Id. at 1102-03.
290. Id.
291. id. at 1105.
292. Id. at 1106.
293. Id. at 1107 (quoting Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483 (1988)).
294. Vittitow, 43 F.3d at 1107.
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federalism concerns, refused to rewrite the city ordinance. Since the court
found the ordinance's complete ban on residential picketing was in conflict
with Madsen, it therefore reversed and remanded with instructions for the
district court to issue a permanent injunction enjoining enforcement of the
ordinance. 2-
Judge Boyce F. Martin, in his dissenting opinion, applied a much broader
reading of Frisby and would have remanded the injunction to the district court
for revision consistent with Madsen. According to Judge Martin, Frisby's
rationale for balancing the constitutional rights involved would permit a re-
striction on other forms of picketing, not just those taking place in front of one
residence. 21 In his view, "the targeted homeowner is as much a captive au-
dience when picketers repeatedly march in front of a home as when they are
standing still."297 Judge Martin interpreted Frisbv to create a "zone" of prohi-
bition and Madsen to somewhat define that zone. He concluded that the three-
house zone created by the district court injunction burdened no more speech
than necessary to protect residential privacy, 2" but suggested that the Su-
preme Court should consider modifying the public forum doctrine in this con-
text. Judge Martin proposed that residential streets and sidewalks be reclassi-
fied in light of the privacy interests involved.2
The Supreme Court may be forced to clarify its position on residential
picketing as abortion clinic personnel increasingly become the target of protest
activities in their own neighborhoods. In addition, the neighbors of abortion
doctors and clinic personnel have become fearful that protests in their neigh-
borhoods will become violent."' Activity aimed at intimidating individual
doctors and clinic workers is likely to increase as protestors consider it the
most effective way to cause those employees to quit their positions.0 Joseph
Scheidler, executive director of the Chicago-based Pro-Life Action League has
remarked that "campaigns against doctors are more effective than clinic block-
ades, which require a steady supply of protestors willing to risk arrest."' 2 If
the risk of arrest in residential neighborhoods increases, however, perhaps
some of the tactics waged against abortion providers and their employees will
cease.
295. Id.
296. Id. at I110 (Martin, J., dissenting).
297. id. at IIII.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 1112.
300. See Leef Smith. Doctor's Neighbors Fear Violence as Abortion Pickets Hit Home,
WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1995, at Metro 1.
301. See 1993 Clinic Violence Survey Report supra note 21, at 5; see also Ana Puga,
Pressed More Providers Halting Their Practices, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. I, 1994, at I; Abor-
tion Rights Leaders Plan to Leave Pensacola, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 30, 1994, at 6B.
302. Sandra G. Boodman, Abortion Foes Strike at Doctors' Home Lives Illegal. litimnida-
tion or Protected Protest?, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 1993, at Al.
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Ill. FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO CLINIC ENTRANCES ACT
On May 26, 1994, President Clinton signed the "Freedom of Access to
Clinic Entrances Act" (FACE).""1 The law amends Chapter XIII of Title 18
of the U.S. Code and prohibits blocking access to clinics, damaging clinic
property, and injuring or intimidating patients and staff." It provides crim-
inal penalties and civil remedies including injunctive relief and compensatory
and punitive damages. 5 At the signing, both President Clinton and U.S. At-
torney General Janet Reno expressed their commitment to ending the nation-
wide campaigns of violence that prompted the need for more adequate federal
legislation."
On June 4, 1994, six protestors in Milwaukee were the first charged with
violating FACE when they blocked the entrance to a Milwaukee abortion
clinic by chaining and cementing themselves to vehicles in front of the clin-
ic."" The six protestors were each convicted of a misdemeanor for a first-
time, nonviolent offense."' In addition, the U.S. Department of Justice filed
the first civil lawsuit under FACE seeking damages against the Milwaukee
protestors on December 20, 1994."' 9 Recently, two protestors in Fargo, North
Dakota who attached themselves with bicycle locks to cars placed in front of
the entrance to North Dakota's only abortion clinic, were charged with a civil
FACE violation.10
The highly publicized trial of former minister Paul Hill marked the first
time a FACE violation was sought for murder.. Hill was charged and found
guilty under FACE for murdering Dr. John Britton and his volunteer escort
James H. Barrett on July 29, 1994 outside the Ladies Center in Pensacola,
Florida.3"' As a result of the jury verdict on the FACE charge, Hill received
two life sentences in federal prison. Florida Circuit Judge Frank Bell sentenced
Hill to death on state murder charges.
-12
303. 18 U.S.C.A. § 248 (1994); see also Ruth Marcus, President Signs Clinic Access
Law, Foes File Lawsuit, WASH. POST, May 27, 1994, at AI0.
304. 18 U.S.C.A. § 248 (1994).
305. 18 U.S.C.A. § 248(b)-(c) (1994).
306. Marcus, supra note 303; see also As Congress Adjourns, FACE Bill Wins Passage
in House and Senate, WASH. MEMO (The Alan Guttmacher Institute, Wash., D.C.), Nov. 23,
1993, at 1.
307. Stephen Labaton, Law on Abortion Protestors Gets First Test, N.Y. TIMES, June 7,
1994, at AI4.
308. 6 Convicted of Blocking Milwaukee Clinic, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 16, 1994, at 13.
309. U.S. Sues Protestors Who Blocked Milwaukee Clinic, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 21, 1994, at
3.
310. Feds Seek Restraining Order, Civil Damages in Abortion Protests, STAR TRIB., Jan.
20, 1995, at 2B; 2 Who Blocked Abortion Clinic Entry in Fargo MOy Face Federal Charg-
es, STAR TRIB., Nov. 23, 1994, at 4B.
311. Trial in Abortion Doctor's Slaying will Test Clinic Protection Law, S. F. CHRON.,
Oct. 3, 1994, at A4; Mike Clary, Hill Found Guilty in Abortion Shootings Violence: The
Former Minister is the First Person Convicted of Violating the Nation's New Clinic Access
Law, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1994, at Al; Ronald Smothers, Man Accused in Clinic Slayings Is
Convicted on Federal Counts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1994, at Al.
312. William Booth, Abortion Clinic Slaver is Sentenced to Death, WASH. POST, Dec. 7,
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John Salvi IlI, the suspect in the more recent murders of abortion clinic
personnel in Brookline, Massachusetts, may also face penalties under the fed-
eral clinic access law. 3 The Brookline murders have spurred a new wave of
federal action aimed at protecting abortion clinics and their personnel. U.S.
Attorney General Janet Reno asked the Department of Justice to evaluate
whether additional legislation may be needed to "stem the violence" at abor-
tion facilities."4 In addition, U.S. Marshalls issued a list of security tips and
delivered them by hand to every abortion clinic in the nation. The eight-page
document suggested surveillance cameras, buzzers, metal detectors, intercoms,
bullet-proof vests, police detail, security guards, escorts for patients, bullet-
proof glass, and automatic door locks as means to increase safety." 5 Also,
the Justice Department filed the first of several civil lawsuits that implicate
protestors who have threatened doctors, against a protestor in Cleveland ac-
cused of threatening to kill an abortion doctor and attempting to run him off
the road."' This new protection effort may assuage the fears of those who
believed FACE and its goals would be undermined by the new Republican
majority that entered Congress following the November 1994 elections." 7
Prior to the election, however, there was widespread concern about
FACE's effectiveness in deterring violence. On September 22, 1994, the
House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice
held an oversight hearing to evaluate the enforcement of FACE." ' The Sub-
committee listened to the statements of Jo Ann Harris from the Justice Depart-
ment; James Brown from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
(ATF); Linda Taggart from the Ladies Center in Pensacola, Florida; Dr.
George Klopfer from the Fort Wayne Women's Health Organization, Sergeant
William Walsh from the Fort Wayne Police Department; Susan Finn on behalf
of the Pro-Life Movement and others.3 The Justice Department reported
1994, at Al.
313. Eric L. Wee, Clinic Slaving Suspect Caught Shooting ait Norfolk Abortion Center
Tied to Massachusetts Attacks, WASH. POST. Jan. I, 1995, at AI.
314. ABORTION REPORT, Spotlight Ston FACE: Pro-Lifers Say it Limits Speech; Reno
calls for Review, 6 ABORTION REPORT No. 118, Jan. 13, 1995, available in WL APN-AB
Database. List & Date Query.
315. Marshalls Advise Clinics-Sniff Mail, Then Open Tips to Protect Abortion Providers,
S. F. CHRON., Jan. 7, 1995, at Al l.
316. Id.
317. See generally Carol Jouzaitis, Abortion Foes' Strength in Congress Could Impede
Medical Research, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 20, 1994, at I; Fawn Vrazo, Conservative Ascendatcy
Propels Abortion to the Crossroads in '92, Anti-Abortion Forces Felt Doomed. No,, Since
Tuesday 'v's Vote, They' v Sudden*y Can Count on Powerful Sympathizers ii the Majority At
Many Levels, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 13, 1994, at A15; Nirmala Bhat, Abortion Factions
Draw New Battle Lines ii Anticipation of GOP-Controlled House, STAR TRIB., Nov. 16,
1994, at AI0. However, on Nov. 16, 1994, in a telephone interview with the author, Wil-
liam R. Yeomans, Legislative Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights at
the U.S. Department of Justice, stated there was "no reason to believe [FACEI will go by
the wayside," and that the Justice Department will continue to enforce FACE "as the facts
and terms of the statute dictate."
318. Robert Pear, Abortion Clinic Workers Say Law is Being Ignored, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
23, 1994, at A16.
319. Witness List, House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee
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that it had, along with the ATF, FBI, and Marshalls' service, undertaken a task
force investigation into the criminal activities of protestors to assess the exis-
tence of a nationwide conspiracy. 20 Despite this and other federal efforts,
Linda Taggart testified that local police and the F.B.I. refused to enforce
FACE when she contacted them in June 1994.2- Susan Hill, president of the
National Women's Health Organization, also testified that she had difficulty
finding someone to enforce the new law. '2 This lead subcommittee chair-
man, Rep. Charles E. Schumer, to conclude that, "[tihe Justice Department
must do better. There is not adequate enforcement of this law. 323 While the
Senate voted 99-0 at the end of January 1995 to approve a non-binding resolu-
tion asking the attorney general to fully enforce FACE, Senator Barbara Box-
er, who introduced the resolution, felt protection for clinics is not high on the
new Republican majority's agenda.324
FACE has also been attacked in numerous lawsuits filed in federal district
courts by protestors challenging the law's constitutionality. Five of the six
cases have affirmed that FACE does not violate the First Amendment rights of
protestors and is a permissible use of congressional law-making power under
the Commerce Clause.32 On June 17, 1994, Judge Leonie Brinkema for the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia issued the first FACE
ruling in American Life League, Inc. v. Reno.2- Judge Brinkema found the
law reasonable and appropriate because it only prohibited the conduct of pro-
testors who threaten violence, commit violence, or physically block a clinic
on Crime and Criminal Justice, available in 1994 WL 51762, Sept. 22, 1994. For full text
of the prepared statements of the witnesses at the Sept. 22, 1994 hearing before the House
Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice, see WL "USTEST1MONY" database.
320. See Testimony of Jo Ann Harris, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division,
U.S. Department of Justice, before the House Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice,
Sept. 22, 1994, available in 1994 WL 517647, at *4; see also Jury Seeks Link Anong Abor-
tion Clinic Attacks, Justice Department Task Force Subpoenas Witnesses, CHI. TRIB., Dec.
15, 1994, at 24.
321. Pear. supra note 318.
322. "Federal officials tell us to go to local authorities and the local authorities," she
said, "tell us that they have no jurisdiction, that we have to get the Feds to do it." Id. In a
telephone interview with the author, William R. Yeomans, Legislative Counsel with the Jus-
tice Department, explained that local law enforcement are initially responsible for making
arrests and then, one of ninety-six U.S. attorneys across the country, in conjunction with the
Civil Rights Division at the Justice Department, would make the decision whether or not to
press FACE charges. He also remarked that clinics had been advised they can call the Civil
Rights Division directly regarding possible FACE violations. See supra note 317.
323. Pear, supra note 318.
324. Fox Butterfield, Abortion Clinics Forti, Defenses; U.S. Faulted on Protecting Sites,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1995, at At.
325. See United States v. Brock, 863 F. Supp. 851 (E.D. Wis. 1994); Riely v. Reno.
860 F. Supp. 693 (D. Ariz. 1994); Cook v. Reno, 859 F. Supp. 1008 (W.D. La. 1994);
Council for Life Coalition v. Reno, 856 F. Supp. 1422 (S.D. Cal. 1994); American Life
League, Inc. v. Reno, 855 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Va. 1994). But see United States v. Wilson,
No. 94-CR-140, 1995 WL 114802 (Mar. 16, 1995 E.D. Wis.).
326. 855 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Va. 1994); see AMERICAN POLITICAL NETWORK Spotlight
Stor , FACE First Ruling Says its Constitutional, 5 ABORTION REPORT No. 225, Jun. 17,
1994, available in WL APN-AB Database, List & Date Query.
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door. 7 Subsequent cases followed Judge Brinkema's reasoning in holding
that FACE does not abridge the First Amendment freedoms of abortion protes-
tors. Additionally, in Council for Life Coalition v. Reno,2 Judge Gonzalez
pointed to ample congressional findings to uphold the legitimacy of congres-
sional power to regulate in this area.329
The U.S. Supreme Court may soon have the opportunity to make its own
determination with regard to FACE.3 Considering the overwhelming ap-
proval of FACE thusfar in the courts, it seems unlikely that the Court would
strike down the law as unconstitutional. Some scholars, however, would
disagree.' For now, anyway, FACE remains an important tool in the effort
to protect abortion providers, their staff, and patients. FACE was designed and
approved by a Congress and an Administration that could no longer let violent
protest go unnoticed. While Congress may now house fewer supporters of a
woman's right to choose abortion, almost all agree that violent social protest
cannot hide behind the First Amendment. Future administrations as well will
likely support FACE and other efforts to stop domestic terrorism perpetrated
by opponents of abortion.
IV. THE RESULTING FRAMEWORK
Solutions to the problem of abortion clinic violence are gradually acquir-
ing some cohesiveness. After much trial and error, advocates for choice are
discovering what works in the courtroom and what does not. Abortion clinic
personnel and patients must tolerate the peaceful dissemination of antiabortion
views. They should not, however, be made to fear for their lives and the lives
of their families on a daily basis. Over the past few years, lengthy legal battles
have provided some guidance about what is appropriate behavior for both
sides. In addition, recent legislation and other efforts have given abortion
providers the tools for protection against day-to-day harassment.
A. The Short-term Solutions
Arrest by local law enforcement is the first step in stopping illegal protest.
Law enforcement personnel have become more aware of the increased risk of
violence associated with antiabortion activity and may be more likely to re-
spond than in the past. While many protestors are not deterred by arrest, fines,
or even jail time, state and local authorities must continue their efforts to
uphold applicable laws and enforce standing court orders. A local arrest is also
the first step in bringing FACE charges. After a suspected violator has been
327. American Life League, 855 F. Supp at 142.
328. 856 F. Supp. 1422 (S.D. Cal. 1994).
329. Council for Life Colation v. Reno, 856 F. Supp at 1431.
330. Assessing the constitutionality of FACE was listed among issues that may be in the
offing for the Supreme Court's 1994-95 term. See Lyle Denniston, Supreme Court Justices
Get On-The-Bench Training, BALT. MORNING SUN, Oct. 2, 1994, at IA.
331. See, e.g., Michael S. Paulsen & Michael W. McConnell, The Doubtful Constitution-
ality of the Clinic Access Bill, I VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 261 (1994).
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arrested, local police and clinic administrators should contact the closest U.S.
attorney or the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice. Provided
there is enough evidence, the U.S. attorney may then proceed with a FACE
prosecution.-
Obtaining a state court injunction may be the best way to prevent clinic
blockades. As is clear in Madsen, a picket-free zone to maintain clinic access
is an acceptable restriction on the protestors' First Amendment freedoms. On
the federal level, under § 248(3)(c)(A) of FACE, a "person involved in provid-
ing or seeking to provide, or obtaining or seeking to obtain services in a fa-
cility that provides reproductive health services" '  may seek a preliminary
or permanent injunction in federal court. FACE provides injunctive relief not
only for the protection of clinics and patients, but may also be used to estab-
lish a picket-free zone around the residences of clinic staff. In order to comply
with Madsen, however, such a zone must be less than 300 feet and must be
supported by sufficient evidence."
In general, FACE provides a quicker remedy than is available under §
1985(3) of the Ku Klux Klan Act or § 1962(c) of RICO. For a RICO case in
particular, evidence may take years to compile. An attorney general may im-
mediately seek an injunction,"' compensatory damages, or civil penalties un-
der FACE. A prosecution under FACE, however, may only be sought against
those who directly participate in a specific incident, while RICO provides a
means to impose liability on antiabortion leaders who coordinate nationwide
demonstrations. Nevertheless, FACE is an extraordinary tool for those who
seek to protect women's access to reproductive health care.
B. Long-term Solutions
While collecting large monetary judgments from abortion protestors may
be difficult, imposing liability under § 1985(3) of the Ku Klux Klan Act and §
1962(c) of RICO is a viable means to curb lawless behavior in the long run.
Interpretation of the hindrance clause under § 1985(3) remains unclear after
Bray."6 The Ninth Circuit, in two opinions following Bray, has read the hin-
drance clause to require only proof of a conspiracy to prevent or hinder state
332. See generaly Stop the Terrorism: Understanding Your Rights Under the Freedom of
Access to Clinic Entrances Act (NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., Wash., D.C.)
(1994).
333. 18 U.S.C.A. § 248(3)(c)(A) (1994).
334. See Kaplan v. Prolife Action League of Greensboro, 431 S.E.2d 828 (N.C. 1993)
(modifying a restriction on residential picketing after Madsen), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2783
(1994).
335. For example, U.S. Attorney Steve Hill successfully obtained an injunction under
FACE against Rescue Radio producer Regina Dinwiddie to prevent her from coming within
500 feet of all abortion clinics in western Missouri and from threatening staff and clients
outside the Planned Parenthood of Greater Kansas City clinic. See AMERICAN POLITICAL
NETWORK, State Reports Missouri: Pro-Lifer Gets Ist Restraining Order under FACE, 6
ABORTION REPORT No. 114, Jan. 9, 1995, available in WL APN-AB Database, List & Date
Query.
336. 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
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law enforcement from securing for women the constitutional right to an abor-
tion. In both National Abortion Federation v. Operation Rescue33 and Port-
land Feminist Women's Health Center v. Advocates for Live, Inc., the
Ninth Circuit rejected the contention that proof of a class-based animus and a
constitutional right protected from private interference are necessary to make
out a claim under the second clause of § 1985(3).11 9 Until the Supreme Court
clarifies application of the hindrance clause, such a remedy may be available
in the lower courts.
On remand from the Supreme Court, NOW v. Scheidler 34 is still await-
ing trial in the district court to determine whether plaintiffs' evidence demon-
strates a RICO conspiracy. Since then, the U.S. Supreme Court has denied,
without comment, two requests for review of other cases involving RICO
liability in the context of abortion protest."' Most notably, the U.S. District
Court for the District of South Carolina issued a final order October 11, 1994,
in Palmetto State Medical Center, Inc. v. Operation Rescue,342 which includ-
ed a jury award of $25,000 in actual damages on a RICO claim against abor-
tion protestors. An appeal is pending in the Fourth Circuit.1
43
As mentioned above, RICO provides a means to impose liability on the
leaders of antiabortion organizations. These leaders may be able to escape
prosecution under FACE by never participating directly in the protest efforts
they orchestrate. If they can be linked to various nationwide demonstrations,
however, they are susceptible to liability under RICO. The current federal task
force investigation into the sources of clinic violence may unearth enough
evidence to support a federal RICO prosecution. The time-consuming and
costly nature of such a lawsuit makes it an unlikely option for clinics and their
advocates who have limited resources. In addition, organizers hide their assets
and claim insolvency, making it less worthwhile for civil plaintiffs.' Proof
of an "enterprise" may also become tougher as the organizers of antiabortion
events scramble to conceal evidence of their alliance." 5 Nevertheless, RICO
337. 8 F.3d 680 (9th Cir. 1993).
338. 34 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 1994).
339. But cf. Women's Health Care Services, P.A. v. Operation Rescue, National, 24 F.3d
107, 109 (10th Cir. 1994) (adhering to Justice Scalia's dicta claiming the hindrance clause
and deprivation clause are similarly restricted); Upper Hudson Planned Parenthood, Inc. v.
Doe, 836 F. Supp. 939, 949 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (predicting that the Supreme Court would, in
all liklihood, impose the extratextual requirements on the hindrance clause as well).
340. 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
341. See Supreme Court Rejects Another Anti-choice Appeal in Racketeering Suit,
REPROD. FREEDOM NEWS (Center for Reprod. L. and Pol'y, N.Y.C.) Dec. 16, 1994, at 2.
342. Information regarding this final order can be obtained from the court. The case
docket number is CA-89-2548-3-6.
343. A prior appeal was dismissed upon the Fourth Circuit's finding that the district
court order was not yet final. Palmetto State Medical Center, Inc. v. Operation Rescue; Op-
eration Lifeline, No. 90-2688, 1994 WL 468123 (4th Cir. Aug. 31, 1994) (unpublished opin-
ion).
344. See Paul M. Barrett, New, Legal Weapon in Abortion Fight Is Hard to Use and
Hard to Enforce, WALL ST. J., Jan, 28, 1994, at BI, B3; Ana Puga, Battle Against Illegal
Protests Follows the Money Trail, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 31, 1994, at 1.
345. Interview with Katie Reinisch, Director of Public Affairs, Planned Parenthood of the
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is a valid remedy to combat the source of organized violent protest.
Another long-term solution may come in the form of state and local legis-
lation. Many states are preparing to draft their own clinic protection legislation
in the hopes of stemming the violence. 4 ' States or municipalities may also
draft legislation to create bubble zones around clinics and residences in com-
pliance with the limitations set out in Frisby and Madsen. Additionally, intro-
duction of the new abortion pill, RU-486, into the U.S. is seen by some as a
possible end to abortion clinic violence.3"7 RU-486, however, will not elimi-
nate the need for some surgical abortions."4 It may also cause protestors to
single out patients taking the drug for increased harassment."
CONCLUSION
Whatever form it may take, protection for abortion clinics, their personnel,
and patients is imperative so long as the violent tactics of abortion protestors
continue. Social protest is a legitimate form of expression protected by the
First Amendment to the Constitution. A woman's right to terminate her preg-
nancy is also protected by the Constitution. Thus, there exists a conflict be-
tween two equally justified constitutional guarantees. One should not necessar-
ily be elevated over the other. The only solution seems to be a compromise.
Women walking into an abortion clinic must tolerate voices and signs that
oppose abortion. Protestors must allow women to exercise their right of re-
productive choice. Only when those who oppose abortion respect others' right
to choose will the violence cease.
There is much room in the public forum for speech-even outrageous
speech that many would find offensive. Only in a truly "open" public forum
will opposing viewpoints lead to enlightenment and change. There is no room
within that discussion, however, for violence and hate. It is the duty of the
courts to draw the line at violence masquerading as protected free speech.
Neither side in the abortion debate is likely to convince the other that their
Rocky Mountains, in Denver, Colo. (June 8, 1994).
346. See Rebecca Blumenstein, Assembly Votes to Protect Clinics, NEWSDAY, Jan. 24,
1995, at A14; AMERICAN POLITICAL NETWORK, State Reports Virginia: Legislature Ma' See
Clinic-Access, Notification, 6 ABORTION REPORT No. 115, Jan. 10, 1995, available in WL
APN-AB Database, List & Date Query; Maine Meeting Will Discuss Abortion Access, BOS-
TON GLOBE, Oct. 25, 1994. at Metro 22.
347. See RU-486 and the Abortion War, ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, Jan. 10, 1995, at A14
(arguing that RU-486 could diffuse the abortion war); The Brookline Clinic Murders, WASH.
POST, Jan. 3, 1995, at A14, (arguing that RU-486 provides a long-run defense to abortion
clinic violence). But see Anita Manning, Abortion Pill: An Answer or A New Problem?,
USA TODAY, Jan. 24, 1995. at Al (reporting on the protest efforts aimed at clinics and
patients participating in the clinical trials of RU-486).
348. For an in-depth report on RU-486, see Carol Jouzaitis, RU-486: Europe's Use
Shows Problems of Pill Abortions Still Are Not Easy to Obtain or to Experience, CHI. TRIB.,
Oct. 2, 1994, at I, and Carol Jouzaitis, Abortion Pill's Next Hurdle: U.S. Testing to Begin
RU-486 Fate Here Uncertain Despite Success in Europe, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 3, 1994, at I.
349. In November 1994, the Portland Life Ministries group launched its "No Place to
Hide" campaign outside the homes of participants in the clinical trials of RU-486. See
Across the USA: News From Ever), State, USA TODAY, Nov. 18, 1994, at 9A.
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viewpoint is right. Individuals will be forever entrenched on both sides of the
abortion issue. Let the battle, however, be fought with pens and on podiums,
not with guns and bombs on the steps of abortion clinics.
Tracy S. Craige

